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PEOPLE AS RESOURCES:
RECRUITMENT AND RECIPROCITY
IN THE FREEDOM-PROMOTING
APPROACH TO PROPERTY
JEDEDIAH PURDY†
ABSTRACT
Theorists usually explain and evaluate property regimes either
through the lens of economics or by conceptions of personhood. This
Article argues that the two approaches are intertwined in a way that is
usually overlooked. Property law both facilitates the efficient use and
allocation of scarce resources and recognizes and protects aspects of
personhood. It must do both, because human beings are both
resources for one another and the persons whose moral importance
the legal system seeks to protect. This Article explores how property
law has addressed this paradox in the past and how it might in the
future.
Two bodies of nineteenth-century law highlighted this paradox: the
law of labor discipline for slaves in the antebellum South and for free
workers in the laissez-faire “Lochner era.” The law struggled over
how to balance recognition of laborers’ bodies as resources with
regard for them as legal persons. These jurisprudential problems
tracked contemporary debates in political and economic thought
about the nature of property in human beings. Both the legal debates

Copyright © 2007 by Jedediah Purdy.
† Assistant Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B. Harvard College, J.D. Yale Law
School. This Article reflects my deep and continuing debt to David Grewal and Sanjay Reddy
for conversations on the political economy of freedom. I have benefited greatly from comments
on an earlier draft by Jeff Powell, Laura Underkuffler, James Boyle, Chris Schroeder, Catherine
Fisk, Joseph William Singer, and Christopher Elmendorf, and from conversation with David
Barron and participants in Duke Law School’s Early Stages Workshop. I am indebted to Jessica
Areen for research assistance and productive discussion. This is the second of three projected
articles on the theme of property and freedom. The first is Jedediah Purdy, A FreedomPromoting Approach to Property, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005).
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and their broader counterparts responded to the underlying problem
of designating a boundary between those respects in which people are
to be regarded as resources and those in which their personhood
comes first. Disputes over this boundary are disputes over both claims
on resources and the moral importance of human beings.
This analysis illuminates the stakes of two contemporary issues:
voluntary peer production in digital media and the entrance of women
in developing countries into the paid workforce. Both demonstrate
how legal, technological, and social changes in people’s status as
resources interact with changes in how they do or may value one
another. When the resource-regime changes are in the direction of
greater reciprocity, they may help to produce a more robust
conception of personhood and a more egalitarian and attractive social
life.
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INTRODUCTION
How should we think about the law of property, the law that
distributes claims on the useful, beautiful, and pleasurable things in
the world? Should we try to understand how it makes us rich, and ask
how it could make us even richer? Should we explore how it makes us
who we are, and ask how the law can reinforce or change those
identities? Or should we ask how it makes us free, and how it could
make us even freer? I take the last approach. Choosing that approach
raises several questions, which this Article addresses.
First, setting out the freedom-promoting approach requires
explaining its relationship to other approaches, particularly the ones
concentrating on property’s economic advantages and its connection
to personhood, which indisputably describe deep human interests and
important ways in which property regimes can advance them. Second,
the freedom-promoting approach needs a working definition of
freedom, a multifarious concept that is a challenge to make
analytically tractable. Third, it needs an account of what property
systems do that shows how promoting freedom is not just an
attractive idea in general, but an apt account of the activity of these
legal regimes in particular.
In a previous article I identified a freedom-promoting tradition
in property thought and connected it with some current debates in
property reform and theory.1 Here I take on the challenges I have just

1. Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition
for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005).
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listed. I show how property regimes, in some of their central
operations, confront the fact that people are at once bearers of
personhood and economic resources for one another. Neither the
economic nor the personhood approach takes full account of this fact,
which spans and confounds their respective concerns. By exploring
some of the ways that this difficulty has shaped doctrine and political
history, I develop a description of property that takes account of both
features of human beings. I argue that property regimes come closest
to reconciling these conflicting qualities when they maximize
reciprocity among persons, which makes it necessary to take others’
personhood into account even when seeking to treat them as
resources for one’s own purposes. I argue further that a theory of
reciprocity goes some distance toward specifying what freedom
means in evaluating property regimes.
Two approaches to understanding property regimes have
dominated legal scholarship for decades. The first, the economic
approach, understands the function of property regimes as being the
allocation of resources. From this point of view, property rights
respond to certain basic facts about the social world. People need
resources, from air, water, and land to technology, ideas, and the
labor of others, to accomplish much of anything. The world is thus full
of desired resources, things that people want to control. Many of
these resources are scarce, not in the sense of being rare, but in that
there is competition over them; that is, they are not so abundant as to
be effectively nonrivalrous. These facts underlie the great gains to
social coordination and productivity that property rights produce.2

2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32–34 (6th ed. 2003)
(“[L]egal protection of property rights creates incentives to exploit resources efficiently.”);
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1320–21 (1993) (defining the
“efficiency thesis,” that “land rules within a close-knit group evolve so as to minimize its
members’ costs” (emphasis removed)). The influence of economic analysis on legal scholarship
has been so powerful in recent decades that an enormous amount of work on the dynamics of
property regimes has addressed the economic efficiency secured by the coordinated pursuit of
respective self-interest. See generally Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. 359 (2002) (discussing a possible way “societ[ies] can overcome the obstacles
that might block a transition to a more efficient property regime”); David D. Haddock & Lynne
Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 545 (2002) (applying Harold
Demsetz’s proposal that the development of property rights reflects cost-benefit ratios to
changes in medieval property rights after the Black Death); Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy
Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 181 (2003) (“The law and economics
literature has advanced the optimistic view that property rights have evolved in a way that
promotes economic efficiency. I suggest . . . there is an alternative and skeptical view that is
interest group, or politically driven.”); Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of
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These benefits are conventionally designated as gains to static
and dynamic efficiency. Static efficiency aligns the present allocation
of resources with effective demand—desire backed by purchasing
power. Clear property rights enable potential purchasers to identify
the present owners of resources they believe they desire and to trade
around until all resources are in the hands of those who most value
3
them (and can pay). Dynamic efficiency maximizes the productivity
of resources over time. Owners are assured of being able to capture
the increase in value from the improvements they make, and thus
have incentive to make these improvements by turning deserts into
fields, sand into silicon chips, and words into sonnets and songs.4
The description of property as the law of resources has been
important at least since Aristotle, and has been central to Anglo-

Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (2002) (arguing that the competing stories of efficiency
and interest-group opportunism leave uncertain whether property regimes reliably secure
efficiency); Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property
Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 589, 589 (2002) (examining “Harold Demsetz’s
prediction that property rights emerge as the benefits of doing so exceed the costs in the context
of oil and gas resources in the United States”); Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz
Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 331 (2002) (reviewing
Demsetz’s theory while noting its silence on the question of how institutions take advantage of
potential efficiency gains by changing property rights); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 456 (2002)
(examining “the relationship between exclusion and governance as elements of property rights
over resources of varying sizes, in the presence of changing resource values”); Jonathan Baert
Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J.
677 (1999) (applying these concerns to new issues of resource governance); Katrina Miriam
Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
117 (2005) (emphasizing the relevance of political institutions to the success or failure of
property law in changing to take advantage of potential efficiency gains).
3. Transaction costs complicate this claim by impeding exchanges that, absent transaction
costs, would produce gains to both parties. The classic statement of the relevance of transaction
costs to the design of property rights is Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960). Also significant here are the costs of creating and enforcing property regimes,
which may be greater than the gains the rights make possible. The canonical treatment of this
issue in modern legal scholarship is Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347 (1967). As many commentators have noted, Demsetz gave no account
of the governance structure that would translate individual desires for property rights into
explicit, enforceable rights. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 2, at 333 (“It said virtually nothing
about the precise mechanism by which a society determines that the benefits of property exceed
the costs.”).
4. Dynamic efficiency works perfectly only with perfect internalization of all benefits and
costs attending the exercise of one’s property rights—an improbable condition, but one that
reality approximates under some circumstances. A major discussion of the differential relevance
of externalities concerns to different types of resource use appears in Ellickson, supra note 2, at
1327–35 (discussing “large,” “medium,” and “small” events, for which externalities are,
respectively, diminishingly important).
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5
American legal thought for several centuries. With the rise of the
law-and-economics perspective in recent decades, it has become
dominant in the teaching of property and property scholarship.6
This description may be either celebratory or critical, depending
what one takes as the normative purpose of a property regime. A
normative commitment to wealth-maximization, perhaps with some
side-constraints, has characterized a fair amount of the commentary
on property regimes.7 From this perspective, the static and dynamic

5. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 20, 44 (Ernest Barker ed., Clarendon
Press 1946) (“[P]roperty of this order [that is to say, for the purpose of subsistence] is evidently
given by nature to all living beings.”); JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285, 314–16 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960)
(1690) (“And thus, without supposing any private Dominion, and property in Adam, over all the
World exclusive of all other Men, which can no way be proved, nor any ones Property be made
out of it; but supposing the World given as it was to the children of Men in common, we see how
labour could make Men distinct titles to several parcels of it for their private uses . . . .”);
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *1–2, *4–10 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803) (“There
is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination and engages the affections of mankind, as
the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of any other individual in the
universe.”).
6. On scholarship, see supra note 2, and works cited therein. For some respectful
questions about the uses and limits of economics in understanding and normatively guiding the
law of resources, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., What Good Is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 175 (2003). Thompson emphasizes that although a maximizing calculus may not in practice
provide a satisfactory comprehensive schedule of social welfare, the analytic tools of economics
are invaluable in the following respects: for designing efficient means to ends however selected,
id. at 179–86; understanding the perennial threats to effective policy, such as externalities,
commons tragedies, and collective-action problems, id. at 186–90; and presenting one’s own
commitments in a language generally available to other citizens in the public sphere, id. at 194–
95. For a more theoretical and playful take on the same issues, see Carol M. Rose, Property as
Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 37, (1990), which argues that the neoclassical microeconomic account of rational
behavior cannot account for the cooperation and modest altruism that enable property
institutions to arise and persist, id. at 37–57.
7. This is the logic of the economic analysis in the scholarship cited in note 2, supra. See
POSNER, supra note 2 in particular. Posner’s attempt to vindicate wealth-maximization as a
theory of justice has not found much success, and Posner himself has abandoned it, but the
wealth-maximization criterion remains a default position as analysts seek to point out where
avoidable transaction costs or missed opportunities for propertization produce deadweight loss
by inhibiting transactions that would otherwise take place. For an innovative application of this
analysis to overextended property rights, see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV 621 (1998),
which argues that too many people in post-Soviet Russia held the power to exclude others from
property, creating transaction costs that prevented transfer of the property to higher-value uses,
id. at 658–59. For a discussion of the doctrinal structure of property law in light of efficiency
considerations, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000), for an argument that the
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benefits of property rights make up most of the benefits of property
8
regimes. A competing normative approach starts from the same
economic description of ownership, but criticizes its effect on
individuals with scant property who can make a living only by selling
their time and talents, often on unfavorable terms. In American law
the canonical expression of this approach is the work of the legal
realist and institutional economist Robert Hale, who continues to
inspire critical property scholars.9 Representatives of this competing
normative tradition characteristically claim an idea of freedom or
well-being as their standard, and argue that static and dynamic
efficiency do not necessarily maximize these qualities or do not
produce a just distribution of them.10

traditional limit on the number of forms property rights may take limits information costs and
enables property markets to achieve allocative (static) efficiency, id. at 4–9. For Posner’s more
ambitious philosophical project, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE (1981).
8. Ellickson, supra note 2, provides a classic and powerful encomium to this conception of
property rights. See generally works cited supra notes 2, 6–7. Outside the legal academy but in
the realm of legal reform, a particularly evocative presentation of the market-enabling power of
property rights is HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 39–67 (2000), which outlines the
efficiency effects of legally designating the productive aspects of resources as the objects of
fungible and universally transferable right-claims.
9. See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE
GOVERNING POWER 3–34, 385–99 (1952) (diagnosing property rights as establishing economic
relationships of reciprocal threat and exploring modes of legal mitigation and equalization of
threat). Joseph William Singer has continued to do important and theoretically ambitious work
in Hale’s vein. See Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611,
650–51 (1988) (“As Hale tried to teach us, every transaction takes place against a background of
property rights. And the definition, allocation, and enforcement of those entitlements represent
social decisions about the distribution of power and welfare. No transaction is undertaken
outside this sphere of publicly delegated power; the public sphere defines and allocates the
entitlements that are exchanged in the private sphere. At the core of any private action is an
allocation of power determined by the state.”). Duncan Kennedy has also pursued Hale’s line of
analysis, both with explicit acknowledgement and under implicit influence. See Duncan
Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327, 327 (1991)
(reviewing Hale’s account of law and connecting it with other radical theories of power);
Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 209–21
(1979) (analyzing private-law rights as a mode of mediating between autonomy and
interdependence).
10. Hale himself addresses this issue in a glancing way. See HALE, supra note 9, at 541–50
(discussing the role of economic liberty under democratic government). For a discussion of the
effort to recast ideas of liberty in light of critical analytics of legally constituted private power
and a description of the progressive thought of T.H. Green, John Dewey, John Stuart Mill, and
others, see BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT
HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 37–70 (1998). Nobel Economist
Amartya Sen has developed a capabilities-oriented account of welfare economics in part

02__PURDY.DOC

1054

3/9/2007 7:45 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1047

The second leading approach to property is the personhood
approach. From this perspective, the function of property law is to
express and enforce a specific conception of personhood: autonomy
over a certain sphere of one’s own choices and possessions and
corresponding protection in that sphere from the intruding demands
of others.11 In this account, ownership of resources, including the
power to exclude others from them, creates a bulwark against
12
interpersonal invasion and a sphere of autonomous action. In some
versions, the most important aspect of this function is self-ownership,
the power to dispose of one’s person and time freely and a protection
against outright ownership by others.13 Other accounts place more
stress on self-ownership as synecdoche, an aspect of property rights
that expresses the logic or essence of the whole scheme of private
property, and indeed of rights-holding itself.14 Still others regard

because of the recognition that static conceptions of efficiency bear only minimally on the actual
condition of life enjoyed by those who participate in the allocation of resources to their highestvalue users. I briefly introduce Sen’s account in Part IV.A.1, infra.
11. The classic discussion of the personhood perspective is in Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982), which introduces the terminology of
personhood to American legal debate through a discussion of legal doctrine and Hegel’s theory
of identity, id. at 957. Because I distinguish among several quite distinct perspectives on the
personhood approach, of which Radin’s is one, I present their representatives respectively in the
following footnotes rather than lump them together here.
12. See id.; infra notes 13–15.
13. For writers from this perspective, property is the keystone of negative liberty, the
“guardian of every other right” that gives substance and certainty to the immunity against
interference. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (1992) (“[T]he protection of property
ownership was an integral part of the American effort to fashion constitutional limits on
governmental authority.”); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 331–34 (1985) (arguing in favor of an absolutist conception
of property rights, where such rights include exclusive use, disposition, and full alienability);
RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM, at xii (1999) (arguing that property is a necessary
prerequisite for political liberty). As I discuss particularly in Part II, infra, this perspective
emerges historically from the free labor politics of the nineteenth century, but in its propertyabsolutist version is something of a caricature of that rich and socially informed idea of the
importance of self-ownership.
14. Carol Rose calls this the “symbolic argument” for the importance of property rights.
See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 349–51
(1996) (“If property is so important for the visualization of all rights, then property itself
becomes the critically important right: it is the symbolic means through which people convey
and receive the meaning of all rights.”). Margaret Jane Radin’s argument that treating certain
kinds of resources as property creates an instrumental subject-object relationship to them is a
critical version of this argument. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (discussing the moral-psychological effects of considering, for
example, organs and human beings as commodities). A similar argument that goes more to the
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ownership as enriching identity by enabling owners to identify with
15
and express themselves through the external objects they control.
The personhood approach, like the economic approach, is a
description that allows more than one normative evaluation. The
major strain of the personhood approach praises property rights as
16
supportive of freedom. Another school, particularly associated with
Jennifer Nedelsky, argues that the conception of personhood that
property rights promote is normatively unattractive: too rigidly
bounded, too individualistic, and correspondingly obtuse to the extent
and importance of human interdependence.17 A third, identified with
Margaret Jane Radin, takes a pluralist approach, arguing that
property rights aimed at allocating resources in market-efficient ways
are appropriate for resources valued chiefly as commodities, but that
certain possessions, such as the home, the body, and objects with
intimate associations, have value more closely related to the identity
of the person who owns them.18 On this account, governing those

self-conception of property-holders than to their views of the objects they may hold is JENNIFER
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 207–11 (1990) (describing “the distorted lens of
property”). For a more positive and traditional view of ownership as synecdoche for autonomy,
see 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *23 (12th ed. 1873) (1823). Kent
explains, “An estate of freehold . . . . denoted anciently an estate held by a freeman,
independently of the mere will and caprice of the feudal lord.” Id. at *23. He continues, “By the
ancient law, a freehold interest conferred upon the owner a variety of valuable rights and
privileges. He became a suitor of the courts, and the judge in the capacity of a juror; he was
entitled to vote for members of Parliament, and to defend his title to the land; . . . and he had a
right to call in the aid of the reversioner or remainderman, when the inheritance was demanded.
These rights gave him importance and dignity as a freeholder and freeman.” Id. at *24.
15. Far and away, the outstanding piece in this vein remains Radin, supra note 11. She has
developed aspects of the personhood theme, in conjunction with the market-inalienability
theme, in MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996), in which she argues for
a capabilities-oriented conception of personhood that concentrates on whether property rights
facilitate the realization of a full complement of human potential, id. at 54–101, a condition
Radin styles as flourishing. This criterion falls close to an argument I have made previously. See
Purdy, supra note 1.
16. See supra note 13.
17. See supra note 14. This critical perspective tends to accompany an emphasis on the
importance of interdependence in human life, and on its necessity for any adequate conception
of well-being. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 9; see also Eduardo Penalver, Property as Entrance, 91
VA. L. REV. 1889, 1893–94 (2005) (arguing that libertarian conceptions of the importance of
property neglect the need for human relationships and social participation, which property
rights facilitate and which should be the normative measure of property regimes).
18. See supra note 15.
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goods as market resources distorts their meaning for personhood, and
19
may devalue personhood itself.
This Article partially reconciles these two approaches to
property law. My argument is not that the two are “closer than their
proponents think” or “getting at the same thing,” for they are not:
they are different. It is an important part of my argument, however,
that they are not incommensurably distinct approaches. Rather, they
describe two inextricably entwined aspects of property law. Both are
present in any property regime. Each influences and may set limits on
the other, so that any conception of property as the law of resources
will imply or prohibit some features of a conception of personhood,
20
and vice versa. This Article concentrates on the situation in which

19. See id. This argument has been applied to specific legal and policy questions. See
Jennifer Fitzgerald, Geneticizing Disability: The Human Genome Project and the
Commodification of Self, 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 151–52 (1998) (arguing that regarding the
self as a bundle of alienable resources stunts the ability to discern noneconomic value in
persons); David E. Jefferies, The Body as Commodity: The Use of Markets to Cure the Organ
Deficit, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 655 (1998) (considering the argument that a
market in organs will reduce altruism); Margaret Jane Radin, Conceiving a Code for Creation:
The Legal Debate Surrounding Human Cloning, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1123, 1126 (2002) (“We want
the legal system to make a commitment to an ideal of noncommodification of love, family, and
other commitments close to ourselves. . . . Some people think if we start talking about children
as things we own, and about one as being fungible with the other, and we expect them to
maximize our pleasure in life, we might start actually trading them some day.”); Norman W.
Spaulding, III, Commodification and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of
Market Incentives, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 311–13 (1997) (considering the psychological
experiences of “commodity fetishism” and “alienation” as consequences of commodification);
Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate,
117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 689 (2003) (surveying, in particular, arguments concerned with the
devaluation of commodified goods and relationships, and proposing that the devaluation arises
less from the designation of the goods as commodities than from the character of the
consequent transactions, in which the fungibility of values is assumed); see also Lee Taft,
Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1146–47 (2000)
(arguing that the use of apologies as bargaining chips in settlement negotiation drains a “moral
process” of meaning by making it a “market trade”).
20. A problem may seem to arise here. In the market regime, the general prohibition on
recruitment through threat of violence is a point of criminal law and the ban on slavery a tenet
of constitutional law. What does it mean to set these up as essential contrasts to market means
of recruitment in an account of property law? This concern rests on a confusion of the present
boundaries of property law with the “nature” of property. If it is helpful to describe property
law as governing the terms of recruitment for cooperative activity, then it is unsurprising that
actions (such as the threat of violence) and legal relationships (such as slavery) that have been
categorically excluded from such recruitment should no longer stand as part of property law, but
should instead become part of the “outside of property” law that, by prohibition on certain acts
or relationships, defines how property rights cannot come about or transactions be
consummated, and which rights may not be exchanged. For an excellent discussion of the
perennial tendency to lose track of the two-sided character of any legal definition—what it takes

02__PURDY.DOC

2007]

3/9/2007 7:45 AM

PEOPLE AS RESOURCES

1057

the intersection between the two strands is most fraught and complex:
where the resource that law governs is the time, effort, or bodies of
human beings, and so resource and person are literally coextensive
even as the law strives to disentangle them.
The relationship is a product of legal choices. The key terms of
the competing approaches are not self-defining. There is no
21
ahistorical, context-free meaning of personhood. Neither is there
any timeless and placeless definition of what counts as a resource, or
22
what legal consequences follow from that status. Being a person and

in and what it shuts out—as mutually constitutive of the domain governed by the definition, see
James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 29–32
(Winter/Spring 2003). At the point of historical origin, however, it was clear that the abolition of
slavery and the designation of labor power as personal property alienable only on certain terms
(at retail rather than wholesale, as it were) that defined the triumph of the free labor movement
were significant revisions to the law of property itself. Any particular property regime, then,
may be diagnosed by reference to both its circumstances and its rules of recruitment—in sum,
by the terms of recruitment it sets up for engaging others in one’s projects.
21. Two of the most important and influential treatments of this theme are the very
different histories of Charles Taylor and Michel Foucault. Taylor, following G.W.F. Hegel in the
broadest sense, describes the development in Western thought of an increasingly “deep” and
complex idea of the human being as a bearer of interests, rights, personality, and even a form of
subjective (but not arbitrary) truth. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989) [hereinafter TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF].
Many of the same themes recur—with greater attention to political and social thought alongside
philosophical, religious, and cultural conceptions of personality—in a smaller and more
accessible work, CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES (2004). Foucault’s work
takes a very different tack from Taylor’s, attending not to ideas about personality, but instead to
the institutional practices, the “disciplines,” in which modern personality is formed, with special
attention to those that are “normative” in the sense of embodying their workings in the persons
who inhabit them. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). Late in his life, Foucault took a tack that in some ways
brought him nearer Taylor, developing a new interest in the way that self-understanding gave
ethical shape to people’s relations to their own bodies and their intimate dealings with others.
See 2 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE USES OF PLEASURE (Robert
Hurley trans., 1985). Although less celebrated in recent scholarship, two other works on the
historical development of ideas of dignity and freedom are particularly valuable for their
attention to the relationship of these ideas to economic life, and are in general exceptionally
rich. See BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND
REVOLT (1978) (asking how, historically, inequality and oppression have come to be recognized
as “injustice” and those subjected to them reconceived themselves as competent and entitled to
resist and demand a reform of the social order that imposes those conditions); 1 ORLANDO
PATTERSON, FREEDOM: FREEDOM IN THE MAKING OF WESTERN CULTURE (1991) (arguing
that ideas of freedom developed in the West out of a series of contrasts with slavery, which
reveal the essential interdependence between freedom and the limits imposed by a need for and
vulnerability to others).
22. For discussions of exogenous changes in the value of resources and their relationship to
the development of property rights, see Demsetz, supra note 3 (discussing the effect on rights in
land and hunting among Native Americans of the rise of the European market for beaver pelts);
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being a resource are both conditions that reflect the ideas, social
relations, and economic activity of the times and places in which
people live, not freestanding abstractions that individuals in concrete
times and places approach more or less closely. In its approach to
both resources and personhood, therefore, a legal system does not
simply respond to facts about the world that precede the formulations
23
of law—although, of course, it also does that. Rather, law’s
designation of certain things as resources and certain qualities in
people as constitutive of personhood helps to define both.
My argument is made up of three complementary strands:
doctrine, history, and theory. After sketching how the two dimensions
of property law interact and depend on each other, this Article carries
the analysis through a contrast between property systems based on
slavery or feudal relations, on the one hand, and those based on
universal self-ownership, or “free labor,” on the other. Part I
examines two clusters of doctrinal problems dealing with the terms of
labor discipline in antebellum slave states and in post–Civil War free
labor jurisprudence. In each setting, courts struggled to define a
relationship between two intertwined features of human beings: their
character as resources and their personhood. Part II examines the
debates in political economy and moral psychology that drove the
critique of slave relations and the vindication and critique of free
labor economies. These debates fill out the conceptual problem of the
doctrinal history by revealing what contemporaries thought was at
stake in the choice of property systems. Part III presents an analytic
account of the relationship between serving as a resource and
standing as a person: human beings’ dependence on one another in
nearly all our projects means that we perennially need to recruit
others to our undertakings. The law’s mediation of resource and

Libecap & Smith, supra note 2 (describing exogenous changes in the value of petroleum
resources as a fossil-fuel-based economy arose); Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the
Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990) (exploring changes
in water rights that emerged as water became an energy-producing resource with the rise of
mills in New England). A classic study treating the commodification of labor and reshaping of
social life along market lines as a partly endogenous change is KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1965). Another
methodologically complex view attentive both to changes in the logic of resources with the rise
of industrial capitalism and to the internal workings of legal doctrine is MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (1977) (describing private law as
changing, particularly in its conception of property, to accommodate and facilitate a marketenabling instrumental view of resources).
23. See Demsetz, supra note 3; Libecap & Smith, supra note 2; Rose, supra note 22.
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personhood is thus essential to setting up the terms of recruitment, the
rules and bargaining positions that structure our reciprocal
recruitment. Part IV applies this analysis normatively, considering
two applications at opposite poles of social and technological
development: the production of culture and knowledge in a digital
age and the entrance of Indian women into the labor market. Both
examples show that property law benefits human freedom by
directing interpersonal recruitment toward relative reciprocity rather
than hierarchy. I argue that an important standard for assessing
changes in legal regimes is whether they move the terms of
recruitment toward reciprocity, and that increases in reciprocity
constitute a gain in human freedom.
I. PERSONHOOD AND PROPERTY IN SLAVE RELATIONS AND
LABOR MARKETS
In this Part, I trace the personhood-resource relationship
through strands of jurisprudence in two property regimes: the slave
relations of the antebellum American South and the free labor
employment relations of the latter half of the nineteenth century. To
avoid a possible confusion it is worth stressing that I treat both
regimes as ideal types, recognizing that they contained enormous
varieties of actual relations, and that judges and legislatures
marshaled multifarious common-law and statutory approaches in
both settings.24 My aim is not even to begin a unifying account of

24. A wealth of studies have greatly enriched scholars’ understanding of the complex
particulars of both the slave relationship itself and the world of ideas, institutions, and interests
in which it stood. The great study of the political and legal struggle over slavery in the AngloAmerican world is DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION, 1770–1823 (1975). Davis addresses the status of slavery under law, with special
attention to moments where legal distinctions came under pressure, either through the
conjunction of property and personhood in a single human being, or through the conflict of laws
between free and slave jurisdictions. Id. at 469–522. Also valuable on these themes is EDMUND
S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL
VIRGINIA (1975). Morgan argues that slavery arose in part in response to the challenge of
maintaining labor discipline in a land of abundant resources. Id. at 295–98. On political and
constitutional debates in the years just preceding the Civil War, see WILLIAM LEE MILLER,
ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1996).
All three scholars may be broadly described as liberal students of slavery, inasmuch as they take
ideas and political institutions as substantial drivers of history, although all necessarily take
serious account of the status of slavery as an economic relationship. Two scholars whose classic
studies of the topic represent a sophisticated form of Marxian method, treating ideas and
political institutions with full seriousness but assigning ultimate explanatory power to the limits
and imperatives of economic relations, are EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE
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either regime, but to demonstrate the continuity of the personhoodresource problem between two regimes whose advocates and
interpreters tended to understand them as essentially opposed.
A. “Inherent in the Relationship”: People as Resources in
American Slavery
Antebellum courts wrestled with the doctrinal consequences of
defining one human being as the property of another. The question
was vexed because it was inescapable that designating someone as
property did not erase that person’s humanity as a matter of fact; yet
the designation prohibited recognition of full legal personhood, even
in a time when that category was considerably more differentiated (by
gender, for instance) than it now is.25 Courts thus had to determine in
what respects slaves were to be treated as property and in what
respects as persons. Concurrently, they had to determine what each of
those categories meant.26
WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974), and MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF
SLAVERY, 1810–1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981). The latter two
are particularly helpful in understanding the variety of concrete conditions and practices
contained within the category of slavery.
Two invaluable resources for appreciating the complexity of the contrast between slavery
and free labor are ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS:
THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974) (offering a less important and
disputed conclusion that slavery was sometimes superior in economic efficiency to free labor,
but also documenting slaveowners’ ready combination of pecuniary inducements and bodily
threats to maintain labor discipline, which highlights the complex interaction of these categories
in any actual economy), and ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 3–38 (2001) (arguing that elements of pecuniary inducement
and bodily coercion coexisted in nominally free-labor relations, and documenting some of the
forms of coercion prominent in nineteenth-century labor ties).
25. On these issues, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 179–
201 (1973) (expounding the law of status in nineteenth-century America, with particular
attention to the propertyless, women, and slaves); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 137–242 (1997) (describing citizenship
and status between the adoption of the Constitution and the Dred Scott decision); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11–94 (1992) (describing social
hierarchy and its intersection with political membership and authority in colonial America).
26. As I show, the distinction frequently arose in these terms in judges’ language. It also
appears in contemporary legal commentary. See THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 83 (Univ. of Georgia Press
1999) (1858) (“[T]he negro slave in America, protected . . . by municipal law, occupies a double
character of person and property.”). The seeming paradox routinely draws observations from
historians and commentators. See, e.g., Peter Charles Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull, Editors’ Preface, in
MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY AND
LITERATURE, at ix (2003) (“The statutes of slavery . . . invariably defined slaves as the personal
property . . . of the master. But the rigor of statutory law existed in constant tension with an
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Courts across several decades and many jurisdictions formulated
the problem as one of drawing a line between personhood and
property. “In expounding [the] law,” Chief Justice Taney wrote while
riding circuit in Virginia in 1859, “we must not lose sight of the
twofold character which belongs to the slave. He is a person, and also
property.”27 “The laws of Georgia . . . recognize the negro as a man,
whilst they hold him property,” observed that state’s supreme court in
28
1851. The Supreme Court of Mississippi remarked, “In some
respects, slaves may be considered as chattels, but in others, they are
29
regarded as men.”
The problem of setting this boundary arose when legal
dimensions of personhood came into conflict with the legal incidents
30
of property. Justice Taney’s pronouncement in State v. Amy, for
instance, concerned a claim by a slaveholder that imprisonment of his
slave for pilfering from a post office constituted a taking under the
Fifth Amendment: although she was criminally liable as a legal
person, her status as his property made her imprisonment a
deprivation of his ownership claim.31 More frequently, however, the
problem arose from violence against slaves: the question was whether
the violence at issue crossed lines of immunity the slave enjoyed

inescapable social fact: slaves were not things, like parlor furniture, nor domestic animals, like
dray horses. Slaves were people, like their masters.”). One piece of legal scholarship takes
account of the problem in these terms, although in the context of a broader survey of the uses of
the personhood concept in American law. See Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About
Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1747–50 (2001).
27. United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 810 (C.C.D. Va. 1859) (No. 14,445).
28. Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 583 (1851).
29. State v. Jones, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 83, 85 (1820). Sometimes, however, the matter was
put so as to suggest no legal salience in the slave’s humanity. Thus, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals opined that “Slaves, although they are human beings, are by our laws placed on the
same footing with living property of the brute creation. However deeply it may be regretted,
and whether it be politic or impolitic, a slave by our code, is not treated as a person, but
(negotium), a thing, as he stood in the civil code of the Roman Empire. In other respects, slaves
are regarded by our laws, as in Rome, not as persons, but as things.” Jarman v. Patterson, 23 Ky.
(7 T.B. Mon.) 644, 644 (1828).
30. Amy, 24 F. Cas. at 810.
31. See id. at 799. Taney ruled that slaves were regarded as legal persons for purposes of
enforcing criminal law against them, and that where the government’s bodily expropriation of a
slave was with respect to her as a legal person, the protection of property under the Fifth
Amendment was not triggered. Similarly, Jarman dealt with a claim by a master that a law
entitling the city of Richmond to jail at his expense a slave found unattended. 23 Ky. (7 T.B.
Mon.) at 644. The court ruled that the statute was a reasonable regulation of property, not in
excess of the power “of compelling the owners of such property, so to use it as not to injure and
annoy the rights or repose of others.” Id. at 646.
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under her aspect as a legal person, or instead fell within the owner’s
32
power to manage his property. The issue was particularly acute in
labor discipline: how far could a master go in coercively extracting a
slave’s labor? The question went to the slave’s character as a valueproducing resource, which here came directly into conflict with the
bodily integrity, dignity, and autonomy of personhood.
Some judges took the attitude that the conflict was illusory or, at
worst, an unnecessary product of masters’ overreaching: there was no
inherent conflict between property and personhood.33 A model of this
approach appears in the dissent in Commonwealth v. Turner,34 argued
before the General Court of Virginia in 1827.35 The majority upheld a
master’s demurrer to an indictment “for cruelly beating his own
36
slave.” The majority based its acceptance of the demurrer on the
existence of a state statute, passed in 1788, that forbade the killing of
37
a slave as of a freeman. As the majority observed, that statute
replaced two far more permissive laws, a 1669 statute exculpating any
master “for killing his slave under correction for resistance” and a

32. In Jones, the issue was whether it was possible to commit common-law murder against
a slave; the court found that it was, reasoning in part that “a slave may commit murder and be
punished with death; why then is it not murder to kill a slave?” Jones, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) at 83.
In Neal, the court found by contrast that the killing of a slave was not a felony under the
common law, as the slave relationship was not recognized in common law and thus was not
subject to common law regulation. Neal, 9 Ga. at 583.
33. See William W. Fisher III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, in SLAVERY
AND THE LAW 43–85 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997) (offering an illuminating portrait of this
paternalist approach to justifying the slave relationship, which assimilates it into a broader logic
of reciprocal duties up and down the lines of a social and economic hierarchy). Fisher contrasts
this approach to a racialist model of slavery that “solves” the problem of the personhoodresource relationship by demoting Africans to a status less than fully human. Id. For a textured
discussion of the paternalist attitude, see ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE & EUGENE D.
GENOVESE, THE MIND OF THE MASTER CLASS: SLAVERY AND FAITH IN THE SOUTHERN
SLAVEHOLDERS’ WORLDVIEW 365–82 (2005) (describing the interaction of chivalric ideas of
duty with the self-understanding of slaveholders).
34. Commonwealth v. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678 (1827).
35. Id. at 689–90 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 678 (majority opinion). Andrew Fede presents Turner and State v. Mann, which I
discuss infra at notes 52–62 and accompanying text, as joint evidence that as slaves, women and
men alike were subject to legally sanctioned and effectively unrestricted forms of violence.
Andrew T. Fede, Gender in the Law of Slavery in the Antebellum United States, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 411, 419–24 (1996). Leon Higginbotham and Anne Jacobs note Turner as an instance of
the general emptiness of nominal legal protections for the slaves in the course of a survey of the
bodily outrages sanctioned by the law of slavery. A. Leon Higginbotham & Anne F. Jacobs, The
“Law Only as an Enemy”: The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and
Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 1034 (1992).
37. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 687.
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1723 statute extending the same immunity to a master killing a slave
38
“for any offence whatever.” Noting that the common law had not
recognized the slave relationship, and thus did not regulate it, the
court reasoned that the 1788 statute must represent the extent of the
law’s protection of slaves from their masters’ discipline. To enforce
common-law restrictions on the master beyond statutory law would
39
be judicial overreach.
In dissent, Judge Brockenbrough argued that the common law
contained principles of labor discipline that courts could legitimately
extend to reconcile the two dimensions of slave status. “The slave was
40
not only a thing, but a person,” he wrote. “[A]nd this well-known
distinction would extend its protection to the slave as a person, except
so far as the application of it conflicted with the enjoyment of the slave
as a thing.”41 Brockenbrough proposed that this formula simply
applied to the slave relationship the standard that the common law
imposed on the disciplinary actions of other status superiors against
their subordinates, such as parent to child, tutor to pupil, and, above
all, master to servant: discipline must fall within “bounds of due
moderation.”42 In Brockenbrough’s formula, permissible discipline
included “every power which was necessary to enable the master to
use his property,” including sale of the slave and “correct[ion] . . . for
disobedience.”43 Severe beatings, however, were as a matter of law
unnecessary to labor discipline and thus outside the “bounds of due
44
moderation.” Permissible discipline was restricted to what was
necessary to manage people in their status as things. When a master
overstepped these bounds, the law could thus regard the slave as a
person and offer the protection of the criminal common law. On this
reasoning, Brockenbrough satisfied himself that he could “see no

38. Id. at 687–88.
39. Id. Proslavery legal commentator Thomas R.R. Cobb thus cited Turner in his account
of the origin and place of the slave’s personhood within American law. COBB, supra note 26, at
83–84. Cobb’s main point was that the personhood dimension arises only with statutory
protection for the slave, and is not inherent in the relationship. Id. Cobb wrote, “So long as [the
slave] remained purely . . . property, an injury upon him was a trespass upon the master’s rights.
When the law . . . recognizes his existence as a person, he is as a child just born, brought for the
first time within the pale of the law’s protecting power.” Id.
40. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 689 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. See also FOX-GENOVESE & GENOVESE, supra note 33, for an elaboration of these
themes.
43. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 689 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
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incompatibility between this degree of protection [of the slave’s legal
personhood] and the full enjoyment of the [master’s] right of
45
property.”
The Tennessee Supreme Court took a view similar to
Brockenbrough’s in James v. Carper, an 1857 trespass action by a
master against a man who had rented his slave, then beaten the slave
severely upon false allegations that he had stolen money from a white
transient in the neighborhood.46 The defendant argued that the
master’s inherent right to punish the slave had traveled with his
47
leasing of the slave, and the trial court accepted this view. The
Supreme Court disagreed, opining that the master’s general right of
punishment against the slave was among “certain peculiar rights” that
attached inherently “[t]o this, as to the various other domestic
relations.”48 The rights of such status-based relationships were not
49
transferable by a contract for services. The renter was thus liable to
the master for harm to the slave.
The court did, however, undertake its own inquiry into the
problem of labor discipline and slavery. This inquiry followed the
logic of Brockenbrough’s proposal to reconcile personhood and
property status by limiting punishment to acts necessary for the
management of property. Someone who rented a slave, the court
noted, “must of necessity be regarded as possessing the right to inflict
reasonable corporal punishment on the slave, for insubordination,
disobedience of lawful demands, wanton misconduct, or insolent
50
behavior.” Such corporal punishment was not status based in the
same sense as the master’s inherent power to punish, but was
bounded by the functional requirements of extracting labor from an
unfree human being. The court acknowledged the vagueness of this
power and its dependence on the circumstances of any particular act

45. Id.
46. James v. Carper, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 397, 397 (1857). The court was not clear on its
view of the scope of the master’s power to punish a slave, noting that a parent possessing the
status-based “paternal power . . . may not exceed the bounds of moderation,” but also
suggesting “for the sake of the argument, that the owner of the slave, in virtue of his absolute
right of property, might take the law into his own hands, and avenge the crime committed by the
slave without appeal to the law.” Id. at 401–02. The precise bounds of the master’s power were
not, of course, at issue in the case.
47. Id. at 401.
48. Id. at 402.
49. See id.
50. Id.
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of discipline, noting that “the hirer must always, at his peril, be able to
show that there existed reasonable ground for the chastisement, and
that it did not, either in the extent or manner of it, exceed the bounds
51
of moderate correction.” Moderation was, of course, relative to the
task of compelling human beings to conduct themselves as property
by yielding up whatever of value they could produce, and
surrendering their bodies to punitive coercion if they failed or
declined to do so.
Other courts, while equally committed to the legality of slavery,
regarded the conciliatory approach as a pleasant delusion. In their
analysis of the slave relationship, the brutality inherent in extracting
unfree labor necessarily overwhelmed any guarantees of personhood
52
in the slave. In the mercilessly reasoned case of State v. Mann, a
North Carolinian shot and wounded a slave whom he had rented for
53
one year, as she fled after he chastised her for “some small offence.”
Unlike the court in James, Justice Ruffin in Mann held that a renter
of a slave had exactly the same power of labor discipline as a master.54
This was so because the master’s power was not part of “domestic
relations,” such as parent-child and master-apprentice ties, but a
legally unique relationship governed by the functional requirements
of labor discipline. Because those requirements were the same for the
renter as for the master, labor discipline had the same bounds in both
situations.55
Ruffin’s rejection of the domestic-relations analogy was critical
to leaving behind the conciliatory approach. Status-constituting
domestic relations had as their purpose the improvement and
eventual emancipation of the dependent party, as with children, or an
idea of mutual advantage and obligation, as with servants.56 “With
57
slavery it is far otherwise,” Ruffin wrote. “The end is the profit of
the master, his security and the public safety.”58 The slave’s legal
status should be defined purely by reference to these ends, with no
independent dimension of personhood. Justice Ruffin defined the

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
Id. at 263.
Id. at 266–67.
Id.
On the law of status in antebellum U.S. law, see works cited supra note 25.
Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 267.
Id.
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question of the master’s authority as one entirely of resource
management.
The slave presented a uniquely difficult problem in these terms,
because he was a conscious agent who, although legally unfree,
retained free will. As a slave, denied any share of what he produced,
he had no incentive to work except bare survival. He was, Ruffin
observed, “doomed . . . to live without knowledge, and without the
capacity to make any thing his own, and to toil that another may reap
59
the fruits.” The master faced a particular challenge in extracting
productive labor from a human being in that position. Where laborers
have no affirmative incentive to work, because no prospect of
improving their situation exists, “obedience is the consequence only
of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else which
can operate to produce the effect. The power of the master must be
absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect.”60 The slave’s
only incentive was avoiding cruel treatment. That cruelty had to be
potentially unbounded, because anything less would give the slave a
sticking point, where he might choose a known measure of suffering
over relentless exploitation with no reward. Such a “discipline” was
thus “inherent in the relation of master and slave,” not because of the
relationship’s status quality—the quality in which Brockenbrough had
identified “inherent” terms in the relationship—but because of the
functional necessities of disciplining unfree labor.61 The doctrinal

59. Id.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Mann has drawn commentators’ interest for well over a century. In a book-length
treatment of State v. Mann, Mark Tushnet partly rejects this interpretation. TUSHNET, supra
note 26, at 37. As Tushnet rightly points out, Ruffin not only expresses ambivalence about the
moral status of slavery and disapproval of brutality toward slaves. He also suggests that the
legislature may in the future choose to govern the master-slave relation in more humane ways
than Ruffin’s decision does. Id. In this respect, the decision is one concerned with the relative
power of courts and legislatures to govern slave relations, not with the “logic of slavery.” Id.
Yet, Tushnet concedes, readers of the case who had taken the language I discuss at face value,
from abolitionist novelist Harriet Beecher Stowe to historian Eugene Genovese, “were not
wrong” because “Judge Ruffin implicitly relied on deep-lying notions about how slavery was
embedded in the life of Southern communities.” Id. Indeed, the case does not purport to
prohibit legislatures from regulating the institution, and Judge Ruffin appears to look favorably
on that prospect, suggesting he cannot consistently regard his armchair sociology of the masterslave relation as being quite as invariant as he elsewhere insists. Nonetheless, his analysis of the
reasons for the courts’ abstention relies on the “inherent” logic of the relationship, which he
presents adamantly. The opinion appears to be divided, as it may be that Ruffin’s mind was on
the issue. As Tushnet points out, as early as his college years at Princeton, Ruffin seems to have
written to his father expressing moral concerns about slavery. Id. at 91–92. The letter his father
wrote in return indicated that he regarded slavery as a great evil, but could see no way for the
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result was a massive effacement of any legal personhood in the slave,
justified as the functional requirement of rendering the slave valuable
62
as property.
In the antebellum slave cases, then, both branches of property
thought are interwoven: personhood and resources entwine in single
bodies of law, in single cases, even in the bodies of the slaves
themselves, who stand in some respects as legal persons, and in others
as mere resources for the value-maximizing use of their owners. The
courts in these cases struggled to understand the relationship between
these two aspects of single entities: human beings as persons, with
responsibilities, aims, and immunities of their own, and human beings
as resources, whose efficient use implied powers of control in those

South to extricate itself from the institution. Id. This expression of a divided consciousness
“bears an uncanny resemblance to the structure of Ruffin’s opinion in State v. Mann.” Id. at 92.
This analysis is broadly consistent with Tushnet’s 1981 analysis of the case in The American Law
of Slavery, where he argues that Ruffin meant to indicate the limits of judicial principle in
governing slavery: although humane sentiments might guide the legislature in drawing lines to
prohibit certain abuses, a common-law analysis of the relationship had to choose between
treating the master’s power as absolute and accepting lines of reasoning that would call the
institution itself into question. TUSHNET, supra note 24, at 54–65. Judicial competence was thus
particularly restricted in regard to slavery, on Tushnet’s account of Ruffin’s analysis. Id.
Citing Harriet Beecher Stowe, who was “appalled at the legal system’s capacity to reduce
a man of intellect and insight to a tool for oppression,” Robert Cover emphasized the aspect of
Ruffin’s reasoning that I have been discussing. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:
ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 78 (1975). He referred with a kind of admiration to
“Ruffin’s unusual refusal to clothe an exploitative and brutal relationship with the trappings of
anything save power,” comparing Ruffin in this quality to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Id. at 77–
78. Cover did seem to make an unfounded inference from Ruffin’s strong language to “a
legislative policy of the utmost brutality,” which he believed Ruffin inferred from “the mere
existence of slavery.” Id. at 78 (emphasis added). I believe Tushnet is right on this point to
direct attention to Ruffin’s apparently inconsistent declarations, including allowance for
legislative reform of slavery, and to the hints of divided consciousness beneath this
inconsistency. Eugene Genovese was moved to a remark on the case similar to Stowe’s: “Never
has the logic of slavery been followed so faithfully by a humane and responsible man.”
GENOVESE, supra note 24, at 35.
Tushnet’s 2003 interpretation is consistent with that of contemporary proslavery
commentators. Thomas R.R. Cobb cited State v. Mann for the proposition that slavery was not a
feature of the common law, and thus “it required municipal law,” i.e., statutes, to protect the
slave’s personhood. COBB, supra note 26, at 83. Cobb, like most Southern commentators,
stressed the statutory regimes that purported to protect slaves against various specific abuses.
See id. at 82–96 (surveying state statutes).
62. A nice formulation of the erasure of slaves’ legal personhood comes in Ruffin’s
opinion: “The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible, that there is no appeal from his
master; that his power is in no instance, usurped; but is conferred by the laws of man at least, if
not by the law of God.” Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 267. A bit later, Ruffin concluded, “this
dominion is essential to the value of slaves as property, to the security of the master, and the
public tranquility, greatly dependent upon their subordination.” Id.
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whose property they were. In so doing, the courts gave content to
both personhood and persons’ status as property. They found
consistently that the definition of the one category—the slave’s
character as a resource—implied some specific content for the other
category, the slave’s character as a person. Whether the master’s
power was notionally limitless or bounded by a principle of
“moderation,” it took its contours, and the slave’s personhood
conversely took its limits, from the requirements of exploiting a
resource that possessed the powers of reason and choice.63
Conversely, to begin with a stronger notion of the slave’s personhood
than antebellum courts followed would have negated the possibility
of the slave relationship in the dimension of resources. There is no
separating the logic of resources from the logic of personhood in
these cases.
B. Labor Discipline under Free Labor
1. The Free Labor Formula. The master-slave relationship was
legally erased by the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process became, in the decades after
the Civil War, the keystone of a new jurisprudential account of the
relationship between personhood and property. This new relationship
expressed what was often called the free labor idea of personhood,
property, and social life.64 The organizing principle of this idea was a

63. A particularly explicit reflection on this difficulty came in Jarman v. Patterson, 23 Ky.
(7 T.B. Mon.) 644 (1828). There the Kentucky Court of Appeals, considering the extent of the
state’s police power to regulate property in slaves, observed: “If the use of any property can
be . . . restrained, certainly that of slaves needs it more than any other; for to the power of
locomotion, they add the design and continuance of human intellect, and of course are more
capable than other animals to injure and annoy society.” Id. at 646.
64. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 1–37 (1970) (describing the premises and social
vision of free labor ideology). For an exemplary contemporary statement of the outlook, see
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, From Address to the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, in SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 233–37 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1992)
(1859) (contending for the dignity of labor and the reality of social mobility, and denying that
market society implies an opposition between permanent classes of owners and laborers).
Within legal scholarship, the emphasis on the continuity between antebellum free labor
ideology and the laissez-faire jurisprudence of the Gilded Age marks what is sometimes still
called the revisionist view of the Lochner era, although there is no longer much to revise of the
previously dominant idea. That older idea began in the Progressive critique of Lochner
jurisprudence as mere dishonesty, a blend of interest-group politics and constitutionally
implausible ideology. The Progressives were more interested in changing a recalcitrant Supreme
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property rule: energy, time, and talent—in a word, labor—were
defined as inherently the property of the person in whose body they
65
66
resided. They were alienable, but only at retail, not wholesale. One

Court than in explaining the intellectual and political origins of its obstructionist attitude to
labor legislation.
Legal scholarship in the revisionist vein was indebted to Foner’s Free Soil and the aligned
work of Charles McCurdy, who contributed to a renewed understanding of the ideological
stakes of the ideas of self-ownership and liberty of contract in the nineteenth century. See
Charles W. McCurdy, The “Liberty of Contract” Regime in American Law, in THE STATE AND
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 161, 161–97 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998) (tracing the origins of the
free labor idea in a rejection of the Southern slave relation and an ideal of economic
independence and exploring its jurisprudential interactions with the Progressive idea of the
benefits that “social legislation” should provide to the disadvantaged). The most extensive
treatment of the Lochner era from this point of view is HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE 1–18 (1993) (explaining the historiographic origins and methodological stakes
of the revisionist approach). For a sketch of this historiographic development, see Manuel
Cachan, Justice Stephen Field and “Free Soil, Free Labor Constitutionalism”: Reconsidering
Revisionism, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 541 (2002). For a very rich interpretation of the variety of
historical narratives, political visions, and jurisprudential agendas that long placed the Lochner
era in the “anti-canon” of cases that must be wrong on any constitutional theory, and have
brought it back into either context-specific or (less plausibly) general validity, see Jack M.
Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 677 (2005). See also Stephen A. Siegel, The Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 631
(2002) (proclaiming that future observers will come to appreciate that historical jurisprudence
was the preeminent form of legal thought in the Gilded Age and that Gilded Age legal
development was a product of diverse contributions); James A. Thomson, Swimming in the Air:
Melville W. Fuller and the Supreme Court 1888–1910, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 139, 140–41 & n.6
(1997) (commenting that an avalanche of revisionism is descending on the 1888–1910 Supreme
Court record).
A magisterial expression of the “revisionist” position is 8 OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN
STATE, 1888–1910 (1993). Fiss rejects the “strategic” interpretation of the Lochner Court’s
jurisprudence as “camouflage” for class interests as inconsistent both with what one can tell of
the Justices’ understanding of their activity and with a view of the law as a potentially
autonomous domain of reason-giving rather than a plaything of interests. Id. at 3–21. In his
discussion of the Supreme Court’s treatment of labor legislation, Fiss contends that a particular
strength of his interpretive approach is its power to make sense not just of the cases in which the
Court struck down regulations, but also those in which it upheld them as appropriate exercises
of legislative power, particularly Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), and Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908). Id. at 155–84. I discuss both cases infra notes 75–92 and accompanying text,
and believe their harmony with the rest of the labor jurisprudence of the free labor period
indicates the strength of this interpretive approach.
65. See FONER, supra note 64, at 11–13, 40–51 (describing the basic tenets of free labor
thought and its stark contrast with the slave system of the antebellum South). Free labor
thought in the United States had its ultimate origin in John Locke’s famous declaration,
“[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands . . . are properly his.” LOCKE, supra note 5, at
287–88. It had its culmination in the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
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could sell one’s time and energy, or the products of one’s labor; but
one could not sell oneself into a condition of servitude, in which the
dispensation of one’s labor belonged categorically (and, usually,
67
indefinitely) to another. It followed that all labor relations were
bounded in principle by the right of exit: as the ultimate owner of his
labor, a worker could take it elsewhere when presented with a better
68
bargain or mired in an intolerable arrangement.
Regarded as an ideal type, free labor lifted the threat to survival
or bodily integrity that had been the backdrop of the slaveowner’s
69
prerogative. The right of exit would have been all but meaningless if
the other party could have answered the exit threat with overt
coercion. Although workers might be seriously constrained in their
alternatives, they could not be kept in place by any threatened

Constitution: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United
States . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
There is an important contrasting conception of free labor, which William E. Forbath
develops in The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L.
REV. 767. Forbath identifies the free labor tradition I trace to Adam Smith and other
progenitors of classical liberal political economy, who concentrated on self-ownership and the
right to alienate one’s labor on terms of one’s choosing. Id. He also describes a competing view,
which he identifies with the American Republican inheritance and with the mid-nineteenth
century labor movement, which identified free labor with ownership of the means of production
or, at least, a right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labor. Id. at 768–82. Forbath regards the latter
tradition as democratic and cooperative, the former as functionally, if not intentionally, an
apology for the often merciless relations of nineteenth-century capitalism.
66. See FONER, supra note 64, and other works cited in that note. This is a corollary of the
prohibition on ownership outright of another’s labor power.
67. Id.
68. This is the key characteristic of free labor in the account of Robert J. Steinfeld, who
gives a helpful and corrective account of free labor as an ideology overdrawn in its proud
contrast with slavery. See STEINFELD, supra note 24, at 1–2 (noting that “[w]hat was crucial in
making free wage labor free was that wage workers were never forced to perform their labor
agreements” either because their employment was terminable at will or because employers had
no meaningful remedy against them for breaching employment contracts by leaving).
69. As noted in the introduction to this Part, the ideal-typical character of this claim is a
crucial limit on its descriptive accuracy. For accounts of some of the ways that bodily threats and
other forms of nonpecuniary coercion figure into nominally free labor relations both before and
after the Thirteenth Amendment, see STEINFELD, supra note 24, and ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 155–68 (1988)
(describing the conditions of limited or nonexistent alternatives in which freedmen entered their
contracts; the contracts’ oppressive terms, which often included a prohibition on leaving
employment over a yearlong contract; and outright refusal by employers to honor the
compensation clauses of their contracts). As Foner notes, although Northern laborers often
entered contracts under straitened circumstances, Southern freedmen from the start struggled
with a system in which even the formal liberty of free labor contracts was at best uncertain and,
as Reconstruction crumbled, became almost entirely fictional. Id.
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consequence more severe than denial of their part of the bargain they
70
had struck with their present employer.
Free labor thought thus solved on its face the paradox of slavery
jurisprudence: how to regard a human being as both a person and an
object of property. The free labor solution sought to eliminate the
terrible paradox of slavery by making personhood legally
incompatible with becoming the property of others. Outlawing the
slave relationship made immunity from being owned a feature of
personhood under the Constitution of the United States. By the same
token, the free labor solution assimilated property in oneself to
personhood: self-ownership became a feature of individual legal
identity under the Constitution. The individual’s ultimate and
absolute claim on her own productive capacity, her own aspect as a
resource, was as complete as the master’s claim on the slave’s body
had been in Ruffin’s version of the common law.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, partisans of free labor praised
it as “the noblest principle on earth” and called freedom of contract
“the foundation of civilization,” a perfect reconciliation of “free
71
choice and social order.” Free labor’s promise to solve the problem
slavery crystallized accounts for much of its nearly millenarian appeal.
This vision nonetheless cloaked the often violent and almost
uniformly exploitative return of former slaves to dependent
72
agricultural labor. Even where it succeeded on its own terms,
moreover, the newly regnant principle did not dissolve the problem

70. A fascinating anxiety about the terms of recruitment and command emerges in the oral
arguments of the pro-slavery side in Somerset v. Steward, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.). The
lawyer Mr. Dunning imagines that, if the slave James Somerset is released, servants will no
longer accept orders from their masters: “It would be a great surprize, and some inconvenience,
if a foreigner bringing over a servant, as soon as he got hither [to England], must take care of his
carriage, his horse, and himself, in whatever method he might have the luck to invent. He must
find his way to London on foot. He tells his servant, Do this; the servant replies, Before I do it, I
think fit to inform you, sir, the first step on this happy land sets all men on a perfect level; you
are just as much obliged to obey my commands. Thus neither superior, or inferior, both go
without their dinner.” Id. at 506.
The abolition of the relationship of prerogative is here envisioned as a breakdown in the
means of social coordination as such, so that the loss of hierarchy verges on the loss of social
control. Id. It is surprising that Dunning did not envision the newly licentious servant proposing
to eat his former master to make up the lack of dinner. Id.
71. FONER, supra note 69, at 155 (quoting “a Tennessee agent” of Reconstruction); id. at
164 (quoting “a Northern Republican” reporting from New Orleans in 1867). The
characterization of contract as reconciling free choice and social order—in the eyes of free labor
partisans—is quoted from Foner.
72. Id. at 155–68.
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we have been exploring, which it purported to resolve. The
relationship between a human being’s character as a person and her
character as a resource remained a puzzle for the law. Rather than
disappear, the problem shifted, still under the general rubric of labor
discipline. In its new version, the question came to be: on what terms
can you extract labor from another person, allowing that one owns
oneself? The problem had been to define the limits of overt coercion
between a free master and an unfree slave. The new problem was to
set the limits of bargaining among free persons. In seeking to hire
another, what may one demand of that person, what may one offer
and what may one threaten to get the arrangement one prefers?
Where will the law draw the line between the protections and powers
of personhood and the transfer and disposal of resources, where both
inhere in the same human being?
I stress that I am not making the naively cynical claim that free
labor reproduced the slave relationship in “wage slavery” (except in
oppressive Southern labor contracts that violated free labor
principles). Nor am I suggesting that treating slavery through the
same analytic lens as contractual relations should diminish in any way
the recognition of slavery as a historically unique wrong. I am saying
instead that there is a fundamental problem wherever the law seeks
to regulate people’s control over the productive capacity of others,
their character as resources, and that although legal change can affect
the answer to that problem in profound and morally imperative ways,
the structure of the problem persists. The problem itself and the
moral and political stakes of legal responses to it are the theme of this
Article.
2. “A Real Equality of Right”? Personhood and Resources in the
Lochner Era. I explore two strands of free labor jurisprudence, one
rooted in the Civil War amendments to the Constitution, the other in
the common law of labor relations. Although the constitutional strand
73
is most famously associated with Lochner v. New York, the “right of
contract”74 that grounded Justice Peckham’s opinion striking down
New York’s maximum-hours statute for bakers was derived from
75
constitutional text in an earlier case, Holden v. Hardy. There, Justice

73.
74.
75.
(tracing

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id. at 53.
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); see also Forbath, supra note 65, at 777–82
the appearance of this constitutional vision in Supreme Court jurisprudence to Justice
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Brown began his analysis with the observation that “due process of
law” in the Anglo-American tradition included the principle that
property, “or right to property, shall [not] be taken for the benefit of
76
another, or for the benefit of the state, without compensation.” He
then proposed a corollary of that principle: if the Due Process Clause
protects existing property rights, it must also protect the right to
acquire property. A prohibition on this right “would also be
obnoxious to the same provision,”77 for it would permanently exclude
those who presently lack property from all the benefits of ownership.
In a third step, Justice Brown derived the right to contract from the
right to acquire property: “[A]s property can only be legally acquired,
as between living persons, by contract, a general prohibition against
entering into contracts with respect to property, or having as their
object the acquisition of property, would be equally invalid.”78 The
right to contract was therefore derived, at two stages’ remove, from
79
the Due Process Clause’s protection of property rights. Two
essential presuppositions marked this reasoning. The first was that the
right to property, including ownership of one’s own labor, was not
mainly a right to static enjoyment of what one already has. Rather,
property rights were instrumental to participation in a world of free

Field’s argument for the plaintiff butchers in the Slaughterhouse Cases. Field argued that the
Civil War amendments had made economic liberty a part of the Constitution and should forbid
interference such as the regulation the majority upheld). Because this Article is not a history of
free labor jurisprudence as such, I begin my discussion with the fuller and victorious doctrinal
formula of Holden v. Hardy. For Owen Fiss’s discussion of Holden as a key to an integrated
understanding of the labor jurisprudence of this period, see FISS, supra note 64, at 172–74.
76. Holden, 169 U.S. at 390.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. While observing that Holden was the Supreme Court’s first application of its
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to labor contracts, Howard Gillman emphasizes a more
conventional dimension of the judgment’s reasoning: the effort, which ran through the
jurisprudence and public debates of the time, to distinguish between legislation proper under
the police power because it promoted the public good and “class legislation” that represented
mere successful rent-seeking by factional economic interests. GILLMAN, supra note 64, at 120–29
(“Holden stood for the proposition that the police powers could be used not only to promote
the general well-being of the community but also the specific physical well-being of a class of
workers who were not in a position to make contracts favorable to their health and safety.”).
This is clearly a major consideration of such jurisprudence, and is particularly salient in
Gillman’s view of Lochner-era jurisprudence as deriving from the antimonopoly animus of
Jacksonian democracy and the earlier antifactionalism of the Revolutionary generation. That
said, it is important, and consistent with the revisionists’ own emphasis on the concerns and
logic internal to jurisprudence, to appreciate the respect in which Justice Brown presents the
opinion as working out the implications of a property concept.
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exchange and self-betterment, so that merely to protect existing
property claims without setting into motion the churn of contractual
exchange would be to obliterate the social purposes of property:
80
mobility and opportunity. The second presupposition was the core of
free labor thought: the property governed by this rationale included
the labor power of individuals. Legal personhood was marked by the
power to acquire and alienate property, including labor itself, which
courts rendered as the right of contract. In this way freedom of
contract became the keystone right in the free labor account of selfownership: it was, in effect, the power of alienation over the property
one held in oneself.81
This right, though, was qualified by two considerations. One was
protection of the health and welfare of certain classes of workers.
This judicial concern arose from the idea that people were in certain
respects state resources, and the demands of private industry must not
degrade them past being able to reproduce and fight wars, two
functions a state was thought to require of its citizens. Thus in
Holden, the Court wrote that even though a miner might consent to
work until his health broke, “[t]he state still retains an interest in his
welfare, however reckless he may be . . . . [W]hen the individual
health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must
82
suffer.” Dissenting in Lochner, Justice Harlan defended New York’s
statute on the grounds that long hours of work “may endanger the
health and shorten the lives of the workmen, thereby diminishing

80. See 2 KENT, supra note 14, at *329 (“When the laws allow a free circulation to
property . . . the operation of the steady laws of nature will, of themselves, preserve a proper
equilibrium, and dissipate the mounds of property as fast as they accumulate.”). Alienation and
the circulation it facilitated were thus instrumental to an idea of equality of opportunity. On the
role of equality of opportunity in sustaining free labor ideology, see FONER, supra note 64, at
29–33.
81. See Forbath, supra note 65, at 785–94. Forbath connects the triumph of this
interpretation with several strains of political culture in the Gilded Age. Id. One is the rise of
industrial capitalism in the North and the resulting presence of a powerful community of
interest in employers anxious not to be restricted in their contracts with employees. Id. Another
is the prominence in the bar, particularly the judiciary, of elite lawyers, often previously
employed by these corporations and shaped by experience and association to identify with their
interests. Id. A third is an ideological transformation by which many formerly populist
Jacksonians, who had begun their political careers as enemies of monopolies and politically
favored banks, came to see labor unions and regulation-friendly legislatures as a new generation
of “monopolistic” barriers to the liberty of ordinary people. Id. In this way a populist tradition
of economic liberty melded with the interests of a growing class of large employers in a synthesis
that many readers will recognize from present political experience. Id.
82. Holden, 169 U.S. at 397 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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83
their physical and mental capacity to serve the state . . . .” In Muller
84
v. Oregon, upholding a maximum-hours law for women employees,
Justice Brewer wrote that, “as healthy mothers are essential to
vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of a woman becomes an
object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and
vigor of the race,” that is, women must be healthy enough to bear
85
children. Oregon’s maximum-hours law was thus “not imposed
solely for [women’s] benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all.”86
Although this theme does not figure further in this Article, it
represented an important element of thought about the relationship
between self-ownership and the claims of others on the resource of
one’s body.
The second consideration returns to the theme of the slavery
cases: the limits of permissible labor discipline. Free labor solved this
question notionally by enshrining self-ownership, so that the terms of
labor were always the products of free agreement, never coerced in
the manner of slave relations. The difficulty was that parties reached
their free agreements always in light of the extent and intensity of
their need and the other options open to them. Depending on these
factors, their decision “freely” to accept any specific set of terms
could be either a choice among meaningful alternatives or an empty
choice between a single tolerable option and privation. The
slaveowner’s offer to his slave was something worse than a Hobson’s
choice, a Hobbes’s choice: obey or be punished, with the legal
boundaries of punishment set by the necessities of labor discipline.87
Free labor repudiated this arrangement, but it left open the possibility
of a Hobson’s choice. The new problem was thus to determine when,
if ever, exigent circumstances made the “free” laborer’s decision so
constrained that his contract was not a product of genuinely free
choice, but instead brought him too near the abject position of the
slave.
This was a major concern of the proregulatory opinion in Holden
v. Hardy, where Justice Brown laid out the problem of unequal
bargaining power:

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 72 (1905).
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 422.
See supra text accompanying notes 25–55.
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[T]he proprietors of these establishments [mines and smelters] and
their [employees] do not stand upon an equality, and . . . their
interests are, to a certain extent, conflicting. The former naturally
desire to obtain as much labor as possible from their employ[e]es,
while the latter are often induced by the fear of discharge to
conform to regulations which their judgment, fairly exercised, would
pronounce to be detrimental to their health or strength. In other
words, the proprietors lay down the rules and the laborers are
practically constrained to obey them. In such cases self-interest is
often an unsafe guide, and the legislature may properly interpose its
88
authority.

The essential threat of the employer was to invoke Brown’s “fear of
discharge,” withdrawing the employee’s opportunity to work in the
employer’s enterprise. Of course, firing was enshrined in the logic of
free labor. The freedom of exit, the employee’s power to quit, marked
an essential distinction between a free laborer and a slave, and the
power to fire was a corollary of the power to quit. The critical
question was how hard a bargain the threat could induce an employee
to accept. That, in turn, was a function of the employee’s alternatives:
only a worker with a bleak set of options would take a grim offer
rather than leave.
The most aggressive application of the idea that hard
circumstances could undercut free choice was also the instance likely
to strike the modern eye as most unpalatable: the sex-based defense
of the maximum-hours law for women in Muller v. Oregon.89 Justice
Brewer noted that the women of Oregon had been granted “equal
contractual and personal rights with men,” and thus that in economic
life “they stand on the same plane as the other sex.”90 This formally
equal liberty, however, did not mean that the logic of free labor
jurisprudence applied alike to men and women. On the assumption
that women were less physically able than men, and thus at a
competitive disadvantage in the labor market, the Court found that
“from the viewpoint of the effort to maintain an independent position
in life, [women are] not upon an equality.”91 Rather, formal liberty
took its substance—choice among meaningful alternatives—only
“where some legislation to protect her” was provided “to secure a

88.
89.
90.
91.

Holden, 169 U.S. at 397.
Muller, 208 U.S. at 412.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 422.
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92
real equality of right.” The distinction between formal equality and
“a real equality of right” bespoke the line free labor courts sought to
draw between the circumstances in which labor agreements expressed
free choice and those in which they reflected choice among such
straitened alternatives that “real equality” gave way to unjust
exploitation.

3. “Fear of Losing His Place”: Free Bargaining and Coercion at
Common Law. The starkest judicial commitment to the employer’s
power to extract concessions with the threat of firing came not in the
substantive due process of Lochner-era jurisprudence, but in a
contemporaneous line of common-law Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court decisions. Those cases addressed employees’ injuries in
hazardous workplaces where they had remained, after objecting to a
manifest risk, only because the certainty of firing was worse than the
probability of being hurt. Massachusetts applied a common-law
version of free labor principles, holding that when employees
accepted a hard bargain they ratified all its consequences, however
unpalatable their alternatives might be. Oliver Wendell Holmes, then
chief justice of the Massachusetts Court, gave the classic statement of
this doctrine in Lamson v. American Ax & Tool,93 just five years
before his dissent in Lochner. The plaintiff in Lamson was an
employee whose position painting hatchets became dangerous when
his employer purchased new racks, which tended to drop the hatchets
94
on Lamson’s head. Lamson had earlier complained about his
Damoclean axes, but “was answered, in substance, that he would
have to use the [new] racks or leave.”95
Holmes found that Lamson had assumed the risk of his
employment by declining to exercise his free labor right to leave. As
Holmes put it, “He perfectly understood what was likely to
92. Id.
93. Lamson v. Am. Ax & Tool, 177 Mass. 144 (1900). When mentioned at all, this case is
usually interpreted as a tort matter involving employees’ assumption of risk in the conditions of
employment. See, e.g., Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing “Duty”, 79 S. CAL. L.
REV. 265, 292–93 (2006) (describing the case as an instance of the doctrine that employees can
assume the risk of employment conditions not by virtue of the reasonableness of the risk, but
rather by virtue of the voluntariness of the transaction). Richard Epstein has described the
opinion in passing in the course of linking Holmes’s strong voluntarism there to his rejection of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 n.14 (1988).
94. Lamson, 177 Mass. at 144–45.
95. Id. at 145.
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happen. . . . He complained, and was notified that he could go if he
96
would not face the chance. He stayed, and took the risk.” It was
critical to Holmes that Lamson identify, and accept, the hard choice
he was up against: “He [assumed the risk] none the less that the fear
of losing his place was one of his motives.”97 The choice between
being fired and remaining in what the sketchy facts of the case suggest
was an unreasonably dangerous workplace was a free and selfauthorizing one, and the worker who took the option of staying
legally accepted the consequences as well. The threat of firing was
merely the legitimate corollary of the free labor right of exit.
The starkest expression of the logic governing these cases came
98
in Leary v. Boston & A.R. Co., where a plaintiff employed as a
laborer was ordered to ride a locomotive as a fireman, a considerably
more dangerous duty than his ordinary job.99 He sought damages
from his employer when he was injured, and the railroad refused to
compensate him. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had
accepted the dangerous additional duty in the face of a threat of
firing, but it was precisely this choice that constituted his assumption
of the risk of his employment.100 Much as Justice Ruffin had done in
his merciless decision in State v. Mann,101 the court recognized the
aspect of threat and coercion in the employer’s presentation of
alternatives, but found them legally in-bounds: “To morally coerce a
servant to an employment the risks of which he does not wish to
encounter, by threatening otherwise to deprive him of an
employment he can readily and safely perform, may sometimes be
harsh.”102 It was, however, only the practical power created by the
reciprocal rights of free labor relations: the employee’s right to sell
labor or exit and take it elsewhere, and the employer’s right to hire
and fire at will. That these decisions might be taken in hard corners—
in conditions of need and with few or no palatable alternatives—
made them no less free according to the courts of Massachusetts,
which found for these purposes that any free employee stood, in the
words of the Supreme Court, “upon an equality” with his employer.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Leary v. Boston & A.R. Co., 139 Mass. 580 (1885).
Id. at 586–87.
Id. at 587.
See supra notes 52–62 and accompanying text.
Id.
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C. The Perennial Problem
These cases demonstrate that the same problem persists through
two very different legal contexts: the master-slave relationship and
the relationship, whether constitutional or at common-law, of free
laborers and their employers. Both regimes are premised on
interrelated legal definitions of personhood and property. In each
case a regime of property in human bodies, energy, and talents
comprises both the law of resources and the law of personhood. An
essential function of this legal regime is to define the relationship
between these two aspects of human beings. This work falls to law
because the central terms of these two aspects of property law are not
self-defining. What is personhood and what counts as a resource, and
what each of those categories permits and forbids people to do to one
another, are interdependent questions.
II. FROM DOCTRINE TO HISTORY: RESOURCES AND PERSONHOOD
IN EARLY-MODERN PROPERTY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
Because “personhood” and “resources” are not self-defining
terms, the next step in understanding their shifting significance is to
open the investigation to consider the backdrop of political thought
and struggle that framed and informed jurisprudential change. The
law’s shifting designation of certain aspects of human beings as
property and other aspects as protected (or criminally accountable)
personhood took place against a backdrop of political and economic
thinkers’ attempts to understand slave economies and free-labor
economies as distinct kinds of social orders. Such thinkers treated
labor recruitment and discipline—the management of people as
resources—as among the most important social relations, which they
saw as shaping individual character and political culture. The logic of
these social relations emerged directly from the interdependent legal
designations of people as resources and as persons. Political and
economic thought thus provided a conceptual vocabulary and
orienting values that filled out the stakes for social life of the law’s
interdependent definitions of property and personhood. This Part
presents two such contemporaneous theoretical positions: the free
labor account of slave societies as embodying a definition of property
that implied a degrading definition of personhood and
commensurately degrading social relations; and the celebratory
account of market societies as reconciling human beings’ character as
property with their character as persons by making the sale of one’s
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own time and talent a matter of formally voluntary agreement. (In my
discussion of Robert Hale in Part III, I turn to the critical account of
this promarket position as an ideological cloak concealing inequalities
of economic power that, when revealed, showed consistent violations
of the idea of equal personhood.) These positions comprise the views
of property and personhood at work in the doctrinal discussion of
Part I: the antebellum courts’ ambivalent attitude toward the human
character of slave relations and the free labor courts’ embrace of
formally voluntary arrangement as self-ratifying even in grotesque
circumstances. Doubts about the adequacy of the celebratory freelabor account powered those courts’ inquiries into whether the formal
equality of free bargainers put them “upon a real equality” that
properly balanced their usefulness to one another as resources with
their status as legal persons.
A. The Case against Slavery and Feudalism
It may seem eccentric to assimilate slavery and feudalism to each
other. The two are often treated separately, in large part because
American discussion is shaped by the experience of New World
slavery, with its basis in racial distinction. Feudalism, as a hierarchical
arrangement of social and economic role within an ethnic community,
seems quite a different phenomenon in contrast.103 Participants in the
debate I am canvassing, however, regarded the systems as so similar
104
as to be continuous with each other. These thinkers were opponents

103. I mean “feudalism” to designate not just the arrangements of early Norman England or
even the Europe of the early Middle Ages, but, generally, a social and economic order in which
stable and marked hierarchy (1) designates fairly specific functions in both the social and
economic spheres, which (2) are interdependent, so that occupying a certain economic position
will imply playing a corresponding social role, and (3) are hierarchical in the sense that certain
prerogatives attach to superior positions in commanding both the economic activity and the
social obeisance of inferiors.
104. Richard Hildreth, a prominent campaigner against American slavery, began his
discussion of the status of enslavement in the Old World with a survey of English and Central
European villenage, including both the outright ownership of persons and the ownership of
persons appurtenant to land (serfdom). RICHARD HILDRETH, DESPOTISM IN AMERICA: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE, RESULTS, AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE SLAVE-HOLDING SYSTEM IN
THE UNITED STATES 177–78 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1970) (1854). The philosophe
Denis Diderot described the depredations of slavery in Europe from Athens and Rome through
the long decline of feudal serfdom, then lamented of New World slavery, “But hardly had
domestic liberty been reborn in Europe than it was buried in America.” DENIS DIDEROT,
POLITICAL WRITINGS 185–86 (John Hope Mason & Robert Wokler eds., 1992). Diderot wrote
of ancient societies, “The more these societies became enlightened, wealthy and powerful, the
more the number of slaves increased, and the more wretched became their fate. Athens had
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of slavery and feudalism and advocates of a commercial alternative
based on voluntary contract, the right of exit, and the free sale of
105
labor. In linking slavery and feudalism, they classified both systems
by reference to what this Article calls the terms of recruitment—the
rules by which one may enlist and govern the activity, in this case the
labor, of another. They understood the basic features of recruitment
in slave and feudal societies to be command backed by threat. In
commercial or free labor societies, on their understanding, the basic
terms were reciprocal negotiation aimed at free assent. These terms,
in turn, produced distinct social relations with consequences for
individual character and political culture.
There was variety in thinkers’ rendering of these themes. In a
particularly stark account, the historian and antislavery theorist
Richard Hildreth described relations between slaves and masters as
founded purely on the threat of violence. In his account, slavery
twenty slaves per citizen. The disproportion was far greater in Rome when it became mistress of
the universe. In both republics slavery led to the worst excesses of exhaustion, poverty, and
shame. Since it has been abolished among us the people are a hundred times happier, even in
the most despotic empires, than they were formerly in the best-ordered democracies.” Id. at 186.
Adam Smith, too, assimilated feudal and slave relations, remarking in his Lectures on
Jurisprudence, “We are apt to imagine that slavery is entirely abolished at this time, without
considering that this is the case in only a small part of Europe; not remembering that all over
Moscovy and all the eastern parts of Europe, and the whole of Asia, that is, from Bohemia to
the Indian Ocean, all over Africa, and the greatest part of America, it is still in use.” ADAM
SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 181 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978)
(1762–63). Smith also characterized “feudall” Europe as “cultivated by villains or slaves in the
same manner as by the slaves in the ancient governments of Rome and Greece,” in the course of
arguing for the exceptional character of the circumstances that ended feudalism in Western
Europe. Id.
105. For a survey of the major themes and commitments of the free labor school, see
FONER, supra note 64, at 1–72 (commenting on the relationship of the ideal of self-ownership
and of a commercial society organized on the free sale of labor and talent to the self-conception
of Northern United States society and the Republican critique of Southern society in the
decades preceding the Civil War). For an ambivalent characterization of the ideology, with a
focus on its cost in conceptions of community and civic virtue as well its gains in liberty and
dynamism, see GREGORY ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS
OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 127–57 (1997) (describing the
views of political economy of jurist and New York Chancellor James Kent, who endorsed a free
labor conception of American law and society but, late in life, regretted the older order those
had swept away). A similar ambivalence appears in Michael Sandel’s treatment of the theme,
which is pitched at the level of political philosophy as much as at that of history. Sandel
characterizes the emphasis on personal autonomy and voluntary social relations in the free
labor movement as representing “a diminished aspiration” from “the standpoint of the political
economy of citizenship” and as marking “a decisive moment in America’s transition from a
republican public philosophy to the version of liberalism that informs the procedural republic.”
MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 200 (1996).
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extended a “state of war” into social life: the master extracted labor
106
from the slave on the basis of a direct threat to the slave’s life. A
subtler account came from Adam Smith, who recognized the
possibility of sympathy and reciprocity between masters and slaves
under certain circumstances.107 Nonetheless, Smith’s account of the
slave bond had the same core as Hildreth’s: the master’s prerogative
was in principle absolute, requiring only orders, not negotiation.
Mortal threat lurked in the background.108 In this theoretical account,
then, the slave and feudal relations had a pair of features. First, they
were either immediately or ultimately founded on a threat to survival:
a villein or slave obeyed the master’s will in order to live. Second,
even where a legal constraint stayed the master’s hand from actual
violence, the slave’s legally protected options were so restricted that
the master had no need to appeal to the material or other interests of
the slave to induce obedience. Command alone sufficed because the
slave had no right to refuse a command and exit the relationship.109
106. Hildreth wrote,
The relation of master and slave, like most other kinds of despotism, has its origin in
war. By the confession of its warmest defenders, slavery is at best, but a substitute for
homicide. . . . Slavery then is a continuation of the state of war. . . . The relation of
master and slave, as we may conclude from the foregoing statements, is a relation
purely of force and terror. Its only sanction is the power of the master; its best
security, the fears of the slave.
HILDRETH, supra note 104, at 35–38.
107. Smith was concerned to show that relatively poor societies, in which masters worked at
the same business as their slaves and might share quarters with them, resulted in more sympathy
and less brutality between masters and slaves. He wrote,
[A] North-American planter, as he is often at the same work and engaged in the same
labour, [he] looks on his slave as his friend and partner, and treats him with the
greatest kindness; when the rich and proud West Indian who is far above the
employment of the slave in every point gives him the hardest usage.
SMITH, supra note 104, at 184–85 (second alteration in original).
108. Describing slavery in the classical world, Smith wrote,
1st, with regard to their lives, they were at the mercy of the master . . . . [H]e might put
a slave to death on the smallest transgression . . . . 2dly, as his life, so was his liberty at
the sole disposall of his master; and indeed properly speaking he had no liberty at all,
as his master might employ him at the most severe and insupportable work without
his having any resource.
Id. at 176–77. Smith was skeptical about the prospects for reform of the institution in the
modern world, proposing that under republican governments, “[t]he persons who make all the
laws . . . are persons who have slaves themselves. These will never make any laws mitigating
their usage; whatever laws are made with regard to slaves are intended to strengthen the
authority of the masters and reduce the slaves to a more absolute subjection.” Id.
109. This is an appropriate time to note an inevitable problem in addressing this issue
through the thought of open and committed opponents of slavery in the public sphere—in a
word, propagandists. In this respect, Smith’s thought and that of his copartisans has a dual
character. On the one hand, it is a form of social inquiry concerned with how economic and
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It was a major part of the argument against slavery that these
terms of recruitment psychologically shaped both masters and slaves,
training the dominant group in tyranny and the subordinates in
110
abasement. Smith contended that masters’ lifelong experience of
giving orders which their subordinates could not refuse would
influence slaveholders’ preferences so that they came to prize
“domination and tyrannizing” over their material interest in the
efficient exploitation of their resources.111 That is, “the pleasure men
take in having everything done by their express orders, rather than to
condescend to bargain and treat with those whom they look upon as
their inferiors,” came to be a source of satisfaction in itself, which
masters would not surrender for the mere gains in productivity that
112
free labor relations promised. Both slave and feudal regimes

legal regimes shape concrete social interactions among persons, which in turn shape individual
psychology and—so far as they are distinguishable—cultural attitudes. On the other hand, this
body of thought is polemic, which strenuously presents one side of a hotly contested argument.
What can be said for this way of proceeding? Perhaps the weaker point in favor of it is that
scant alternative exists. The episodes I am discussing did not occur in an era of systematic and
objective social inquiry: synthetic speculation, usually informed by political commitments, was
the order of the day. The stronger defense is that the thought of partisans is not a second-best
source of information, but rather the best source of a particular kind of information: what those
who participated in the debates regarded as (1) the values to which they were obliged to appeal
and (2) the empirical claims that would most forcefully support their appeal to these values. In
other words, a picture emerges, first, of the critical and justificatory scheme of values in which
debates over property reform were set and, second, of the picture of the social world in which
these values had their force. The recurrence of appeal to certain values (voluntarism and
reciprocity over coercion and legally enshrined hierarchy) and of certain empirical claims (that
the way people recruit one another affects the psychological and cultural viability of these
values) is itself a piece of evidence for the way that a series of political cultures have understood
the purpose and importance of property law.
110. The psychological significance of the interaction between master and slave also became
an important part of the Continental tradition of ethical and social thought, specifically the
theory of recognition. The seminal discussion is G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
111–19 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) (1807) (describing the interaction of “lord” and “bondsman”
in which the two archetypes, one absolutely powerful, the other absolutely dependent, struggle
for survival and recognition). Alexandre Kojeve elevated this exchange to particular attention,
concentrating on Hegel as a theorist of recognition, in ALEXANDRE KOJEVE, INTRODUCTION
TO THE READING OF HEGEL: LECTURES ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 3–30 (Allan
Bloom ed., James H. Nichols, Jr. trans., 1969) (commenting on the “dialectic of master and
slave”). The foremost contemporary theorist in this tradition is Axel Honneth, who expressly
develops his theory of recognition as a driver of social life out of Hegel. See AXEL HONNETH,
THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE MORAL GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS 31–63
(Joel Anderson trans., 1995) (describing the development of a recognition-based social theory
out of Hegel’s philosophical foundations).
111. SMITH, supra note 104, at 186.
112. Id.
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113
seemed to their opponents to produce such personalities. As
Hildreth put it, “[h]abituated to play the tyrant at home, unshackled
regent and despotic lord upon his own plantation, where his wish, his
slightest whim, is law, the love of domineering possesses all [the
master’s] heart.”114
Free labor’s partisans argued that this unbounded authority over
another human being was at the source of what Hildreth described as
an ungoverned Southern planter personality: given to fierce anger,
alcoholism, spendthrift habits—in short, made chaotic by its basic
experience of social relations in which nothing checked the
115
expression of appetite and whim. For free labor theorists, such
personalities were incompatible with the rise of commercial economy
because the irregular and domineering Southern character was illsuited to the steady and self-denying habits of accumulation and
production that Hildreth and others saw as key to the rise of industry
and commerce in place of slave agriculture.116 Tyrannical personalities
were also ill-suited to a conception of democratic society that

113. Smith’s account almost perfectly parallels that of James Mill, English reformer, colonial
administrator, and father of the philosopher John Stuart Mill, in Mill’s account of the motives of
“feudal” landholders in India, which he regarded as having thwarted reformist efforts to induce
a transition to commercial modernity through reform in land tenure. Despite the incentive the
reforms provided to contract free labor rather than maintain feudal relations with dependent
peasants, the landholders preserved feudalism, Mill wrote, because “men . . . as education and
government have previously moulded their minds, are more forcibly drawn by the love of
absolute power, than by that of money, and have a greater pleasure in the prostrate subjection
of their tenants than the increase of their rents.” JAMES MILL, THE HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA
491–92 (William Thomas ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1975) (1820).
114. HILDRETH, supra note 104, at 143.
115. Id. at 142–57. This theme also emerged in slave narratives. Frederick Douglass, the
former slave and abolitionist writer and orator, reflected on the character of his own childhood
master, “[H]e was not by nature worse than other men. . . . The slaveholder, as well as the slave,
is the victim of the slave system. . . . [T]here is no relation more unfavorable to the development
of honorable character, than that sustained by the slaveholder to the slave. Reason is
imprisoned here, and passions run wild.” FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY
FREEDOM 32 (John Stauffer ed., 2003) (1855).
116. See HILDRETH, supra note 104, at 154–57 (“The institution of slavery deprives a large
portion of the people of their natural occupation [production]. But as man is essentially an
active animal, to supply this deficiency it is necessary to create artificial occupations. [Hildreth
proceeds to describe the respective places of gambling, drinking, and politics, in Southern
culture.] It is impossible to make men virtuous or happy unless by giving them some steady
employment that shall innocently engage their attention and pleasantly occupy their time. The
most essential step in the progress of civilization, is, to render useful industry, respectable. But
this step can never be taken, so long as labor remains the badge of a servile condition.”).
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required a measure of mutual regard among citizens and a willingness
117
to pause, to listen, to debate, and to compromise.
B. Commercial Society as a Property Regime: New Terms
of Recruitment
The antislavery and antifeudal position I have been exploring
was also a promarket position. Adam Smith was famously a prophet
of the market regime, and has been lionized and vilified in that
118
Abolitionists, too, were partisans of free labor,
capacity.
understanding the voluntary sale of energy and time on a labor
market as the antithesis of prerogative and threat.119 In endorsing
commercial society, the critics of slavery and feudalism meant to
embrace several interlinked values, including the dignity of labor,
117. For a splendid evocation of this idea, see David Bromwich, Lincoln and Whitman as
Representative Americans, in DEMOCRATIC VISTAS: REFLECTIONS ON THE LIFE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 36, 47 (Jedediah Purdy ed., 2004) (“The imaginative work that persuasion implied
for a man with Lincoln’s aims was immense, and it required him to help his listeners discover
what it was that created the value of life for them.”). Bromwich argues, for instance, that
Lincoln labored to put his Northern listeners in the proverbial shoes of the Southerners they
frequently despised, seeking to draw them into the partial, even grudging sympathy of
recognizing at once the contingency of their own position and the difficult fact of a shared
national fate—on both points the very opposite of state or sectional chauvinism. See id. at 48–49.
118. See EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, CONDORCET, AND
THE ENLIGHTENMENT (2001) (arguing, besides her very rich and sensitive account of the moral
motives of Smith’s thought, that he was much more favorably disposed to the state’s role in
shaping and governing economic life than the libertarian view sometimes traced to him would
suggest). For an instance of the libertarian perception of Smith, see ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY
86–87 (1987) (“This view connects liberty and property by arguing that so long as individuals
use only what is theirs, they cannot limit the liberty of others. Liberty is maximized, indeed,
‘natural liberty’ [Smith’s famous phrase] is unscathed, if everyone employs only what is theirs to
employ and refrains from employing what is not theirs. The only way liberty is invaded is by
incursions on what is not ours. We have here the classical defense of the ‘simple system of
natural liberty’ beloved by Adam Smith.”).
119. For a hostile account of the relationship between abolitionism and markets, see
GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! OR SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 218–19 (C. Vann
Woodward ed., 1960) (1857) (“The whole morale of free society is, ‘Every man, woman, and
child for himself and herself.’ . . . Christian morality is the only natural morality in slave society,
and slave society is the only natural society. . . . In such society it is natural for men to love one
another. The ordinary relations of men are not competitive and antagonistic as in free society;
and selfishness is not general, but exceptionable. . . . Man is not naturally selfish or bad, for he is
naturally social. Free society dissociates him, and makes him bad and selfish from necessity.”).
For a broad and learned treatment of this Southern critique of Northern social life, see FOXGENOVESE & GENOVESE, supra note 33, at 41–68 (depicting the Southern view that the
revolutionary politics of the early nineteenth century threatened property and social order
unless checked by an economic system based on slavery), 201–24 (commenting on the place of
slavery in Southern social thought and historiography), 566–86 (describing the connections
Southerners drew among Northern capitalism, individualism, and skepticism) (2005).
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opportunity and mobility, and the idea of the equality of persons—
and, of course, the increase in social wealth that Smith argued
120
followed from the operations of markets. To varying degrees these
were directly connected with the central analytic idea in the free labor
account of markets: market relations were terms of recruitment, rules
for enlisting the labor and talents of others. Free labor meant that to
recruit another’s labor, one had to negotiate, appeal to the interest
and self-conception of the other. The negotiation might take place in
profoundly unequal circumstances; but it could no longer be formally
a matter of prerogative.
What was the consequence of inevitable negotiation? Smith, a
theorist of moral psychology as well as a jurist and political
economist, provided a particularly rich answer. He believed the taste
for domination over others arose from legal arrangements that made
domination possible by authorizing some to treat others as mute
instruments. In Smith’s description, such masters scorned “to
condescend to bargain and treat with those whom they look on as
121
their inferiors and are inclined to use in a haughty way.” The use of
“bargain and treat” inevitably suggests Smith’s famous reference to
the human “propensity to truck and barter.”122 That is what the
master scorns to engage in and seeks to avoid in his recruitment:
bargaining with others, that is, negotiating with them.
What did bargaining mean for Smith? He explained in the
Lectures on Jurisprudence that “the propensity to truck, barter, and
exchange” was “founded [in] the natural inclination every one has to
123
persuade.” He continued,
The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and
simple a meaning, is in reality offering an argument to persuade one
to do so and so as it is in his interest. Men always endeavour to
persuade others to be of their opinion even when the matter is of no
consequence to them. . . . And in this manner, every one is practising
oratory on others thro the whole of his life.—You are uneasy
whenever one differs from you, and you endeavour to persuade

120. See 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 376–427 and passim (R.H. Campbell &
A.S. Skinner eds., 1976) (1776) (laying out comparisons among nations’ economic
development).
121. SMITH, supra note 104, at 186.
122. See SMITH, supra note 120, at 25 (“The division of labor . . . is the . . . consequence of a
certain propensity in human nature which has view no . . . extensive utility; the propensity to
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.”).
123. SMITH, supra note 104, at 352 (emphasis added).
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[him] to be of your mind . . . . In this manner [people] acquire a
certain dexterity and adress in managing their affairs, or in other
words in managing of men . . . . That is bartering, by which they
adress themselves to the self interest of the person and seldom fail
immediately to gain their end. The brutes have no notion of
124
this . . . .

Giving this passage complete exposition would require
presenting Smith’s account of the social “passions,” or what today is
125
called social psychology, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Without that excursion, consider the main ideas that Smith offers
about negotiation. First, persuasion, the effort to bring other minds in
line with one’s own, is one of the basic activities of human life; people
are motivated to persuasion for its own sake, not just instrumentally.
Second, bartering is persuasion directed at interest: in bartering one
makes a case to another about the content and implications of that
person’s self-interest. A corollary claim is that self-interest is not fixed
but at least in some measure a matter of self-interpretation, which
others may induce one to revise. Third, sustained practice of
persuasion can make it a central element of character.
In the free labor account, engaging in persuasion had several
implications for the way one conceived of oneself and others. First, it
meant being aware of living in a world of other persons, each with
distinct interests and a self-conception, including goals, aversions, and
bases of dignity. Second, it meant recognizing the relativity of one’s
own interests and self-conception to those of others. Announcing
one’s own purposes without considering how they fit or clashed with
others’ interests and self-conceptions would all but guarantee that
these purposes, so far as they depended on persuading the other to
join in them, would go unachieved. To live in a world where
cooperation requires negotiation is to inhabit a social world, where
one must be aware of interdependence with others who are as much
persons as oneself.

124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 3–90 (Prometheus Books
2000) (1759). In this portion of the book, Smith outlines his account of “the passions,” or the
basic psychological motives that he takes to be general to human beings. Smith identifies
sympathy, the desire that one’s thoughts and feelings should be in harmony with those of others,
and emulation, a specific attraction to the powerful, wealthy, eminent, and graceful, as among
the basic principles of social interactions. I provide a sketch of passions theory, particularly
Smith’s, in Jedediah Purdy, A World of Passions: How to Think about Globalization Now, 11
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 23–28 (2004).
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This is not to suggest that persuasion must produce compassion
or egalitarian sentiment. A skilled manipulator is as apt to succeed at
persuasion as a fair-minded sympathizer—perhaps more so because
126
of the tactical clarity of the manipulator’s vision. What this
exposition does suggest, however, is that the satisfaction of wreaking
one’s will on others—the satisfaction of the tyrannical character that
views people as things—will not fare well in a world where persuasion
is necessary to recruit labor. When the terms of recruitment rest on
legal reciprocity, one probably cannot expect robust social and
emotional reciprocity to emerge in consequence; but successful
recruitment will tend to require at least the appearance of respect and
concern for the interests and self-conceptions of others. This was the
social hope of the free labor position. When Smith remarks that
“brutes have no notion” of the form of sociability founded on
persuasion, one wonders whether he refers not only to the African
monkeys whose violent squabbling over food he describes to make his
point, but also to slave-masters and feudal lords.127 Sophisticated free
labor thinkers regarded the awareness of and responsiveness to
others that persuasion required as a humanizing trait, in the
normative sense of humane.128 In their vision a new property regime
implied a new set of characteristic social interactions, with
implications for the shape of human personality.
In this Part, I have presented the arguments in political economy
that formed the backdrop to the doctrinal problem that opened the
126. The vision of market societies as producing skilled manipulators is of course a part of
the concern of antimodern critics such as Fitzhugh. See FITZHUGH, supra note 119, at 219 (“Man
is not naturally selfish or bad, for he is naturally social. Free society dissociates him, and makes
him bad and selfish from necessity.”).
127. SMITH, supra note 104, at 352–53. Smith recounts a description of monkeys robbing
fruit, then, without a way of negotiating its division, fighting over the spoils until many are dead.
128. A striking empirical finding tends to support Smith’s view that markets, reciprocity,
and self-esteem are mutually supportive and generative. The finding arises from “ultimatum
game” experiments, in which the first of two players proposes a two-way division of a sum of
money; if the second player accepts, the money is actually disbursed according to the consensus
division; if the second player rejects it, neither takes any money. Although models of pure
maximizing behavior suggest that the second player should accept even the smallest amount of
money—say a $9.95 to $.05 split of $10—in practice fairness considerations lead players to reject
offers they find insulting or inequitable. In developed countries, offers as low as a 4 to 1
proportion are rejected about half the time. However, “the least-educated groups ever
studied . . . conform most closely to the game-theoretic model (based on self-interest) [and] the
degree of market integration is positively correlated with equality of offers across a dozen or so
small-scale societies, as if market exchange either requires or cultivates norms of equal sharing.”
COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC
INTERACTION 113–14 (2003).
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Article: how to draw the line between human beings’ character as
resources and their character as persons. I have shown that concern
with the terms of recruitment drove theorists’ conceptions of feudal,
slave, and market societies. The practical question that focused the
theoretical problem in the doctrinal discussion of the first Part was
the limits of labor discipline: how might one person recruit and retain
another’s effort, and where did her power to induce or coerce
cooperation end? This Part has shown that this question was thought
to have sweeping theoretical consequences for the character of social
life and of individuals. In the next Part I bring together these
doctrinal and historical discussions in a theoretical account of the
features of human life that make the problem of recruitment
perennial and place it at the nexus of property and personhood: the
thoroughgoing interdependence that coexists with human autonomy.
III. THE ANALYTICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE AND RECRUITMENT
As noted at the beginning of the Article, the resources-based
account of property law begins from a description of the world in
which law operates: a world of scarce and desired resources.
Similarly, the personhood-based account begins from a description of
the human nature with which law interacts: the nature of a species for
which continuity of experience and the capacity to see one’s will and
self-understanding instantiated in the external, physical world are
essential sources of identity.129 Here I explain how human beings are
at once bearers of personhood and scarce and desired resources for
one another’s ends, and thus how a property regime that addresses
the recruitment and discipline of people must incorporate mutually
dependent definitions of both what is a resource and what constitutes
personhood.

129.

See generally works of Margaret Jane Radin cited supra notes 11, 14–15.
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A. The Sources of Autonomy and Interdependence
Human beings have a dual nature.130 People are resources for one
another. Our talents, training, time, energy, our minds, bodies, and
even feelings are necessary to advance others’ projects. We need one
another. We are susceptible, literally, to exploitation. Moreover, like
less controversial objects of property regimes, we are scarce as well as
desired resources.131 Of all the schemes and wishes in human minds,
from making money to making art to making love, only a small
fraction will ever be realized. Those who invent or adopt these
projects need—and mostly fail—to recruit others as investors,
coventurers, employees, or lovers. Our wants, dreams, and selfimages are hostage to our success or failure in recruiting others to
them.132
At the same time that we are resources, means to one another’s
purposes, we each have our own purposes, wishes, and ends. Indeed,
in one version of moral theory we recognize one another as ends,
other purposeful and self-conscious beings owed a duty of reciprocal
133
forbearance. This concept is a cornerstone of modern law and

130. Thinking of human beings as having a dual nature—as objects of causal forces and as
subjects of action, as the creatures of their circumstances but also the makers of those
circumstances, as resources for others and as ends in themselves—has its modern point of origin
in Immanuel Kant’s account of the perspective of causation and the perspective of free action as
respectively ineliminable and mutually irreducible. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON 464–79 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., 1929) (1781) (elaborating the “third antinomy of
reason,” the respectively irresistible but mutually irreducible character of human beings as the
effects of objective causes and as sources of free action). In the contemporary legal academy,
the most influential expositor of an explicit dual-nature theory is Roberto Unger. See ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND TASK, A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY 18–23 (1987)
(describing human beings as at once the products of the cultural, economic, and political
contexts in which they are born and as agents capable of seizing opportunities to revise these
contexts and thus remake their world and themselves).
131. The definition of a valuable resource as one that is both scarce and desired comes from
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.2 (2d ed. 1998).
132. The poet W.H. Auden wrote in his Elegy for Sigmund Freud, “To be free is often to be
alone.” Auden’s formula, however bleak, captures only half of the unhappiness in the human
situation. To be alone is also to be unfree, in the sense of being unable to realize any of the aims
that depend on the recruitment of others. By “free” Auden meant a psychoanalytic goal: to act
without illusion or neurosis, the compulsive repetition of or return to the source of some
developmental trauma. The concern of this Article is to say something about how law, and
specifically the law of property, might make it more nearly possible to be free and yet not alone,
free among others.
133. This phrase, and not a particularly Kantian conception, is all that I mean by “ends” in
this Article. I mean it as synonymous with the qualities captured in the term “personhood.”
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ethics, whether it is rendered as Kant’s characterization of persons as
134
ends in themselves, rights theorists’ specification that each person
carries the same complement of basic powers and immunities,135 the
utilitarian axiom that the pleasures and pains of each shall count
136
137
alike, or the principle of equal protection under law. Each such
account of persons places some limits on how people may recruit one
another to their purposes: respectively, under rules that pass the strait
gate of the categorical imperative, consistent with their basic rights,
consistent with the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or
within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore the
governing conception of personhood, freedom, dignity, or equality
does much to determine the set of human purposes that will be
achieved in any social order. This connection works through the
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politics, and religion has substantially to do with how ideas of the
distinctive value and importance of persons have changed over
139
time. In any time and place, our terms of recruitment reflect the
interaction between these two domains.
B. The Taxonomy of Dependence
I earlier pronounced that people are valuable to one another and
are thus susceptible, literally, to exploitation. I will now give more
specific content to this claim. People need others for a variety of
purposes, which we cannot accomplish without their assistance. What
they need may be affirmative contributions or may take the form of
forbearance. They need one another to survive, to prosper, and to
flourish. Each of these terms designates a set of interests to which one
may appeal in seeking to recruit others to one’s projects. The first
step in understanding the idea of terms of recruitment is to appreciate
these distinct aspects of people’s reciprocal dependence.140
We need one another to survive. That is, we are physically
vulnerable animals, and in consequence we depend on one another’s
protection and forbearance—especially those of stronger
individuals—for our continuing lives. To recruit a person by
appealing to survival is to make an offer that person cannot refuse.
This is the alternative presented to the targets of recruitment in at
least three settings: forced labor in authoritarian societies,
enslavement, and the feudal compact. Come work with me—in
whatever capacity—goes the offer, and I will not kill you, nor will I let
141
others kill you. It is not implausible that the majority of the
recruitment of human effort throughout history has been in these

139. See works cited supra note 21.
140. The account I give bears some similarity to that of HONNETH, supra note 110. Honneth
recognizes three basic requirements for which we depend on others both individually and at the
level of collective organization: love, or bodily integrity and security; respect, or
acknowledgement of equal basic rights; and recognition, or acknowledgement of our
particularity. Another account of necessary interdependence, which stresses the social and
psychological preconditions of autonomous action, is that of ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS (1999).
141. Orlando Patterson presents the relationship between slave status and the threat to
survival in two ways. First, “[s]lavery . . . is . . . a form of personal domination. One individual is
under the direct power of another or his agent. In practice, this usually entails the power of life
and death over the slave.” PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 9. Second, “[t]he slave is always
conceived of as someone, or the descendant of someone, who should have died, typically as a
result of defeat in war, but also as a result of poverty. His physical life was spared” at the price
of the total alienation of his freedom. Id. at 10.
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terms.
We need one another to prosper. For our material well-being, we
depend on opportunities to engage in productive activity and to
consume the fruits of that activity. With the exception of primitive
forms of cultivation and gathering, we produce wealth cooperatively
and consume what others have produced. Recruitment that appeals to
this aspect of interdependence says, “Come work with me, and you
will have more”—measured in whatever the person being recruited
wants—“than you otherwise would.” This is the signal appeal of
market society. It is how we solicit one another in the labor market,
the market for capital (“give me your money, and you will enjoy
higher returns than you otherwise would”), and, if one believes
certain explanations of human behavior, in the “markets” for
142
marriage and sexual gratification.
We need one another to flourish. We need the cooperation of
others in intrinsically fulfilling modes of being or becoming what it is
we wish to be. At least two distinct branches of flourishing require the
recruitment of others. One is vocation, the search for a defining, often
productive activity in which we feel ourselves expressed, augmented,
or improved.143 Another is love, the noninstrumental relations to other
people in which we exercise and develop compassion and generosity;
come through reciprocal recognition to understand our own
experience and personality more fully or clearly than we otherwise
could; and, within the relative safety of intimacy and trust, can revise
our character by taking chances with new modes of desire, expression,
and activity.144 The appeal to flourishing proposes, “Join me, and you
will be more fully yourself than you could otherwise be.”
Different types of interdependence can be nested within the
same appeal. Survival is the limit condition of the appeal to
prosperity, the boundary at which the person recruited is choosing
145
between a recruiter’s offer and starvation. Appeal to flourishing

142. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992) (arguing that sexual and
romantic behavior can be explained by the aim of maximizing sexual gratification relative to a
variety of exogenous constraints).
143. See TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 21, at 211–47 (discussing “the
affirmation of ordinary life,” the protestant development of the idea that in social life and
work—including vocation—people approach the divine as nearly as is possible in this world).
144. See id. at 289–91 (discussing the rising ideal of companionate marriage and intimacy as
a high good).
145. See PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 10 (noting that the basis of slavery is historically the
exchange of freedom for the sparing of one’s life, either in war or in the face of starvation).
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will, for the fortunate, be compatible with choosing an attractive
bundle of “prosperity” goods. That is the position, for instance, of
146
relatively well-compensated writers, artists, and scholars. It is not
too wild-eyed a generalization to suggest that most people give
considerations of flourishing relatively greater weight to the extent
that they believe these considerations are compatible with acceptable
choices along the dimension of prosperity. In a very rough sense,
then, the three purposes—survival, prosperity, and flourishing—are
nested in the order in which I have presented them, with survival
inmost. (This is too simple, of course: aesthetes, spiritualists, and
others may well choose flourishing over prosperity and even over
survival.)
C. The Terms of Recruitment
This taxonomy of interdependence describes the human needs
that law confronts. In defining personhood and resources in human
beings, law both responds to and shapes our interdependence.
Law does this in two ways. First, it sets rules of recruitment.
These specify which forms of dependence one may appeal to in
recruiting others, and in what ways. For example, one basic rule of
recruitment forbids recruiting people by means of threats to their
survival. Despite the fact that we depend on one another’s
forbearance and protection for survival, private individuals may not
threaten to withhold that forbearance—that is, threaten to kill
another—to recruit that person. Second, by allocating claims on
resources, law sets the circumstances of recruitment, the framing facts
of wealth and poverty that substantially determine the relative
bargaining positions of the parties to recruitment. Together these
dimensions of law make up what I have been calling the terms of
recruitment, the combination of legally constituted facts of ownership
and the set of legally permissible combinations of inducement and
threat one may use in recruiting others.
I will develop this account through a brief exposition of the
thought of Robert Lee Hale, the legal realist and institutional

146. For a discussion of different motives in and attitudes toward productive activity, see
UNGER, supra note 130, at 26–35. Unger distinguishes among ideas of work as honorable,
fulfilling a settled and dignified role in a relatively stable or intelligible social order;
instrumental, or enabling one to survive for other satisfactions, but not fulfilling in itself; and as
a transformative vocation, work that “connects self-fulfillment and transformation: the change of
any aspect of the practical or imaginative setting of the individual’s life.” Id. at 29.
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economist who gave the classic statement of property law as making
up terms of recruitment, and then show how my formulation moves
beyond his. Hale described what I have called the circumstances of
recruitment this way: “The law confers on each person a wholly
unique set of liberties with regard to the use of material goods and
imposes on each person a unique set of restrictions with regard
thereto. The privileges, rights, and duties of each person differ from
those of every other person.”147 Hale’s emphasis on the uniqueness of
each person’s rights and duties under property law expresses an
emphasis not on the abstract categories of the law—the forms of
ownership, for instance, which define the several bundles of rights
over things that people may hold148—but on the concrete social world
in which each person is the owner of certain resources and not of
others. Recruitment takes place against this distributive background,
in which each person’s starting point is unlike every other person’s.
Building on this account of bargaining, Hale described economic
life as a system of mutual coercion among all participants. Hale’s
innovation was to concentrate on the power of exclusion that attends
most forms of ownership149 and the threat effect of proposing to
exercise that power against other individuals who need one’s
resources to pursue their projects of survival, prosperity, or
flourishing. This description amounts to a rhetorical inversion of the
conventional account of market relations as comprising voluntary
exchange for mutual advantage, which highlights instead the power of
alienation or transfer and the inducement to another to become
better off by consummating an exchange.150 To that inducement, Hale
contended, there corresponds the threat of nonconsummation, of
sticking at exclusion and denying the other the benefit of one’s own
resources. The point of Hale’s shift of focus is not that owners want to
exclude others from their resources, but that they want to exact the
most favorable terms of access from others who need their resources,

147. HALE, supra note 9, at 15.
148. For a discussion and economic rationale of the limited number of forms that property
rights take, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 7.
149. Important exceptions are rife, but generally recognized as exceptions: for instance, in
real property implied easements and the right of access in certain circumstances of public
officials or medical professionals; and in intellectual property, the right of fair use.
150. For the basic account of allocative efficiency by mutual advantage in the law of
property, see POSNER, supra note 131, § 3.2.
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151
which the threat of exclusion enables them to do. On this account,
the allocation of resources essentially shapes the threats one party
may make against another, that is, the consequences of enforcing the
power of exclusion: if both parties are relatively well-endowed, the
cost of being excluded from the other’s resources—put differently,
the opportunity cost of declining a proffered bargain—will not be so
difficult to absorb. If, however, one party is so poorly endowed as to
need the resources at issue, while the other party is well-enough
endowed to be relatively indifferent to the outcome of the bargain,
then the poorer party will be subject to significant coercion.152 Even in
describing situations of great inequality, Hale saw the coercion as
mutual. The propertyless worker exercises coercion over the factory
owner in declining to work. That is simply a weaker bit of coercion
than what the factory owner exercises in refusing to pay the
noncompliant worker.153 In Hale’s account, coercion represents not a
judgment about the balance of power in a specific transaction, but the
elementary term in his analysis of economic life as a system of
coordination based on the balance of threat.
Hale’s account of property relations as reciprocal coercion is
neither falsifiable nor verifiable. It was a rhetorical choice intended to
highlight certain aspects of transactions that can also be described in
market-friendly terms of mutual benefit or libertarian terms of
voluntary exchange. That is not to say, however, that Hale’s
description has no implication for the assessment of property regimes.
Rather, by concentrating on the circumstances of recruitment, Hale
sought to shift the meaning of “voluntary” relations.154 The libertarian
jurisprudence that Hale attacked arose from the constitutional right

151. See HALE, supra note 9, at 17 (“[A] manufacturer of goods . . . values his right to
prevent their use by others merely as a means of enabling him to exact money from those
others. If successful, he will not, in fact, deny to all others the liberty of using his products, but
because he may deny that liberty he is in a position to impose conditions with which a person
who acquires the liberty must comply.”).
152. “[A] man who for one reason or another is unable to acquire property by which he can
exact a money income from others cannot easily escape the restrictions which other people’s
property rights place on his freedom. If he is unable to own sufficient property of this type, he
may be compelled to accept employment as the only condition on which he can obtain the
money essential to purchase the freedom to eat.” Id. at 18.
153. See id.
154. See FRIED, supra note 10, at 47–59 (discussing Hale’s leveling attack on the formal
conception of voluntary relations that had been a leading legitimating principle in laissez-faire
ideology). Fried’s book is in general an impressively lucid and informative exposition of both
Hale’s thought and the backdrop of intellectual and jurisprudential disputes against which he
and his legal realist contemporaries worked.
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of contract and common-law free labor position discussed in Part I.
That jurisprudence concentrated on formal voluntarism,
characterizing as free nearly any transaction undertaken without
155
threat of violence, blackmail, or some other overt coercion. This
was not an empty, merely nominal voluntarism: rather, it
concentrated on the rules of recruitment, albeit to the near-total
exclusion of the circumstances of recruitment. In this view, the fact
that a bargainer had to choose between one highly disadvantageous
option and several truly dreadful alternatives would not make the
resulting transaction less voluntary, so long as it was not exacted
under threat of overt coercion, such as harm to body or property.156
Hale’s descriptions of the various quanta of threat that different
parties could bring to their recruitment efforts shifted the focus from
formal to substantive voluntarism, attention to the range of viable
alternatives each party confronted, and the costs and benefits
associated with each alternative. Hale showed the implausibility of
simply blessing as “voluntary” a labor contract resulting from the
encounter of the worker’s very small coercive power (the threat of
withholding labor) with the very great coercive power of the
157
employer (the threat of withholding employment).
Having taken Hale as the exemplar of attention to the
circumstances of recruitment, I now want to move beyond his
position. Hale’s description of economic life as a system of mutual
coercion revealed a great deal, but it also obscured the importance of
the rules of recruitment. Hale took market society’s rules of
recruitment as given and argued that they were not enough to secure
a compelling version of economic freedom. Ironically, then, even as
he redescribed markets as systems of unequal power, Hale
inadvertently naturalized the basic terms of market relations, in which
overt coercion was out of bounds.
Yet to do this slights the moral achievement of market rules. It is
no minor fact that under the laissez-faire law that Hale attacked,

155. See id. at 29–33 (describing laissez-faire theorists’ “bland self-assurance in describing
private economic activity as a bastion of freedom”).
156. Fried quotes the Harvard economist Thomas Carver, writing in 1921: “The most
important characteristic of the economic life of civilized people is its freedom from compulsion.
Nearly every economic act of the average individual is one which he does voluntarily. . . .
Among all free people one private citizen is forbidden to exercise compulsion over any other.”
Id. at 30–31 (quoting THOMAS CARVER, PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL ECONOMY 101 (1921)).
157. On Hale’s efforts to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable instances of
coercion, see id. at 59–70.
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recruitment could not turn on overt coercion. That prohibition was
not ideological legerdemain. As discussed in Part II, it was the moral
core of a law of recruitment that arose in direct repudiation of slavery
158
and feudalism. It was for this reason that free labor thought also
included an idea of democratic community. In contrast to the whitesupremacist vision of citizenship that Chief Justice Taney had
159
expressed in Dred Scott and the “mud-sill” theory that social life
depended on a degraded class of workers who did society’s
demeaning work, free labor contended for a different conception of
160
personal dignity and social membership. The heart of the idea was
that honest labor under conditions of equal opportunity meant a fair
chance for all and was dignifying in itself. No one was condemned by
birth to inferior status. Rather, everyone had a shot at becoming a
person of substance.161
The question Hale might have asked, had he taken a different
direction, was not only what was false in the free labor promise to
reconcile our character as resources with our character as persons,
but also what would be necessary to make it true. Addressing this
question requires at least two steps that Hale did not take. One is to
give the rules of recruitment equal standing with the circumstances of
recruitment, as an historically varied and contested effort to give
effect to ways that human beings matter morally. The other is to ask
normatively what is the best potential in the tradition of
understanding the relationship between resources and personhood. In
the next Part, I propose a normative orientation that emerges from
the historical developments I have surveyed. This orientation
concentrates first on maximizing reciprocity in recruitment and
second on maximizing appeals to considerations of flourishing.
IV. A NORMATIVE ORIENTATION: THE ANALYTICS, TRADITION,
AND PROSPECTS OF RECIPROCITY
What should the terms of recruitment be, and why? I argue that
the normative touchstone that emerges from the discussion so far has
two aspects. The first is maximizing reciprocity, relative equality in
interdependence and thus in recruitment. The second is increasing the

158. See discussion supra Part II.A.
159. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399–454 (1857).
160. See discussion supra Part II.A.
161. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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share of recruitment that appeals to flourishing rather than survival or
prosperity. As in earlier portions of this Article, I offer several
complementary modes of argument. First, I lay out two issues in
contemporary law and policy where a gain in these values is possible.
Second, I present an analytic account of the normative criteria I have
laid out, using the examples of prospective reform to show how
recruitment happens, and might happen, under relatively reciprocal
and flourishing-oriented conditions. Before I speak more specifically
to the normative implications of my argument so far, I want to pause
over the word “normative.” I take it that the arguments of this Article
catch its audience mid-stream in the sense that it addresses them in
light of the commitments they already hold.162 I have no ambition to
persuade readers who are determinedly unmoved by appeals to
freedom and reciprocity. Rather, my argument addresses the best
understanding of what it means to be committed to freedom and
reciprocity and the implications of that commitment where it is
properly understood.163 I have presented an account of how law
interacts with changing technologies and values on the one hand and
permanent facts about interdependence on the other. The aim of this
account is to show how changing terms of recruitment can change the
concrete terms of interaction, generating either greater practical
capability and wider choices, or lessened capability and narrowed
options. For those who already accept the goodness of freedom and
reciprocity, concurring with my description may have two
implications. First, it may affect the evaluation of property regimes by

162. This is in contrast to a polar pair of views. The first is that it is possible to produce
normative principles, and arguments vindicating them, whose authority is independent of the
starting point of the arguers. For a relatively minimalist, up-to-date, and secular version of this
view, see JURGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE
ETHICS 19–111 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 1993) (1991) (describing and defending an ethical theory
based on the structure of communication). The second is that normative assessment is
irremediably subjective and insusceptible to rational elaboration that persuades beyond what
the arguers already believe. See Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism, in GILBERT HARMAN &
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, MORAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL OBJECTIVITY 1, 1–64 (1996).
163. This approach to normative argument is consistent with the broadly “hermeneutic”
account of Charles Taylor: although we cannot hope altogether to escape the context of
attitudes and concepts from which we reason, we can clarify and expand our beliefs and, in
doing so, transform them in what we take to be the direction of greater insight. See 1 CHARLES
TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 105–12 (1985) (so
arguing). I believe this mode of argument is also compatible with the concept of democratic
persuasion that I describe. See supra text accompanying notes 123–28.
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drawing attention to the terms of recruitment they establish.
Second, it may affect the conception of freedom itself by emphasizing
its relational character and its constant tension with the
interdependence that is the basis of humans’ interwoven need for,
and vulnerability to, one another.
A. Prospects: Margin of Reciprocity at Two Edges of the
Modern World
There are many places to begin a discussion of how changes in
the terms of recruitment can increase reciprocity. One might begin
with land titling programs for urban squatters in developing countries,
which appear to increase labor-market participation by reducing the
monitoring cost of household security, and may thus set in motion a
trend toward gender equity that I will soon discuss in the context of
India.165 Alternatively, one might look to innovative programs such as
proposed risk-pooling markets which, by mitigating any individual’s
share of the risk of obsolescence inherent in specialization, might
increase real freedom to choose specialized training in line with one’s
gifts, passions, or entrepreneurial ambitions.166 I have discussed both
examples elsewhere.167 Here I take up two other cases, one set in the
developing world, the other on the frontiers of technology. The first
suggests that women’s participation in labor markets affects their
power to influence household decisions, with significant effects for
gender equity generally. The second describes the rise of voluntary
and nonhierarchical production in some technological and cultural
sectors, which presents new possibilities for appeals to flourishing in
164. Among reforms that might fare well under this standard are those I discuss in Purdy,
supra note 1, at 1266–84: turning informal possession of real property into formal title, creating
sophisticated risk-pooling markets that effectively commodify the expectation of good fortune
and high earnings (and thus hedge against their opposites), and ensuring widespread access to
the technologies of cultural production and voluntary peer production. Id. In the third article in
this series I intend to take up the program of asset-creation as a concrete way to explore a
freedom-promoting view of recruitment regimes.
165. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO
TERRORISM (Basic Books reprint ed. 2002) (arguing that Peru’s poor represent a distinct
entrepreneurial class); DE SOTO, supra note 8 (arguing that capitalism fails in poor countries
because the poor lack property rights in their assets).
166. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (2003) (proposing a new risk-management infrastructure that utilizes financial
inventions to insure the gains made by workers).
167. See Purdy, supra note 1, at 1266–71 (discussing Hernando de Soto’s theory on land
titling programs); id. at 1272–78 (discussing Robert Shiller’s proposal to manage risk according
to an employment sector index).

02__PURDY.DOC

2007]

3/9/2007 7:45 AM

PEOPLE AS RESOURCES

1101

recruitment. Taken together, these examples suggest the breadth of
application of the theoretical model I have developed here.
1. Reciprocity in Markets and Households: Resource Value as
Personhood Value. One of the more striking and troubling symptoms
of the differential value human beings place on one another is the sex
asymmetry among children and young adults in East and South Asia.
Better known as the problem of missing women, the phenomenon
now comprises some 100 million young men and boys in excess of the
corresponding female populations in India, Pakistan, China, Taiwan,
and neighboring countries.168 Although scholars offer competing
accounts of the causes behind the asymmetry, no one seriously
disputes that one major cause is that sons are culturally more valued
than daughters in the countries where the asymmetry has
developed.169 This differential valuation inspires both sex-selective

168. See VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES: THE
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF ASIA’S SURPLUS MALE POPULATION 58–66 (2004) (“In 1990 . . .
more than 100 million women were missing nationwide.”).
169. There is considerable debate on the relative proportions of gender disproportion
caused by each of a variety of factors. One class of factors expresses a preference for sons over
daughters, exercised at different points in the cycle of conception and childhood: sex-selective
abortion, infanticide, and preferential caregiving and medical expenditures resulting in higher
levels of childhood mortality in girls than in boys. For an outline of the debate over proportions
among these causes, see Junhong Chu, Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in
Rural Central China, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 259, 259 (2001) (observing that many
Western observers were skeptical that sex-determination technology was widely available in
China, while Chinese scholars resisted the suggestion that postnatal sex discrimination or
infanticide caused the sex disparity). Today it is clear that China’s domestic production capacity
makes possible widespread sex-determination technology, and reported levels of sex ratio at
birth show such a dramatic disproportion that any postnatal addition to the ratio must be
regarded as additional, not supplanting. See infra text accompanying notes 170–81. Another
candidate is inaccurate reporting: some suggest that births of girls are underreported, either
because of low cultural valuation of females or because, under China’s one-child policy, parents
who wish to have a son may conceal the birth of a daughter in an effort to avoid enforcement of
the policy. For a discussion of this question, see Dudley L. Poston & Karen S. Glover, Too
Many Males: Marriage Market Implications of Gender Imbalances in China 8–10 (Sept. 1, 2004)
(unpublished paper, on file with the Duke Law Journal). As Poston and Glover note, however,
Taiwan’s sex disproportion at birth approaches China’s, despite near 100 percent reporting and
no legal constraint on fertility, making underreporting seem unlikely to explain the bulk of
China’s sex ratio. See id. at 9. Moreover, although reliable studies of the nominally illegal
practices of prenatal sex-determination and sex-selective abortion are difficult to come by,
Junhong Chu’s study of one village in which she had earned the trust of participants showed
high levels of both practices. See Chu, supra, at 270, 273 (reporting 39 percent use of ultrasound
sex testing during first pregnancies, 55 percent use in second pregnancies, and 67 percent use in
additional pregnancies; 27 percent of respondents reported at least one abortion, and 86 percent
of that group reported at least one sex-selective abortion). A third candidate is, paradoxically,
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abortion to eliminate female fetuses and greater spending on medical
170
care and nutrition for boys than for girls. In consequence, fewer
girls than boys are born, and fewer of those survive to adulthood. My
interest here is not in this very important demographic problem per
se, but in taking sex differentials in survival as a statistical expression
of the differing personhood value placed on girls and boys. By
aggregating the results of hundreds of millions of family decisions,
these numbers reveal who counts in the marginal decisions of families
often on the edge of privation. They also suggest when and how the
valuation of personhood changes.
Essential indicators of development, such as male literacy,
average income, urbanization, and access to medical care do not
reduce the sex asymmetry; on the contrary, they sometimes
171
correspond to growing sex gaps. Although perhaps unsettling to
anyone inclined to believe in a unified theory of progress, these facts
are unsurprising on the assumption that families prefer sons over
daughters. The effect of increases in basic development is to enable
people to effect their will in more ways than they could otherwise
do.172 Wealth and medical resources increase opportunities to have

improving health overall. Many more male than female fetuses are conceived, but because
female fetuses are hardier than males, the natural proportion at birth only slightly favors males.
Hence, other things equal, an improvement in the health of pregnant women, which decreases
the rate of fetal wastage (miscarriages and stillbirths) should increase the proportion of male
fetuses. For this argument, see generally Dhairiyarayar Jayaraj & Sreenivasan Subramanian,
Women’s Wellbeing and the Sex Ratio at Birth: Some Suggestive Evidence from India, 40 J. DEV.
STUD. 91 (2004). Although attractive for its note of optimism (perhaps not all news of sex
disproportion is bad news!) and for its application of medical insight to social inquiry, this
explanation cannot go far. The world’s richest countries, where fetal wastage rates are
presumably much lower than in India or China, do not even approach the sex disproportions
registered in those countries. In short, it is very difficult to get away from the conclusion that
sex-selective abortions have contributed substantially to sex imbalance.
For one account of the significance of differential valuation of sons and daughters in this
phenomenon, see HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 168, at 131–32.
170. For a start on the dispute, see HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 168, at 112–13. One
study of a hospital in Punjab in the 1980s and 1990s found that 13.6 percent of mothers of boys
admitted—with reticence which may suggest underreporting—having undergone prenatal sexselection; the comparable figure was 2.1 percent for mothers of girls. The other female fetuses
presumably were not carried to term. See id. at 112.
171. See AMARTYA K. SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 197 (1999) (“[V]ariables that
relate to the general level of development and modernization either turn out to have no
statistically significant effect, or suggest that modernization . . . can even strengthen, rather than
weaken, the gender bias in child survival.”).
172. This is a shorthand statement of the theory, associated with Amartya Sen, that freedom
should be measured partly in capabilities, i.e., the range of human potential that people are able
to realize in their lives. Sen has developed this position in many essays. See AMARTYA SEN,
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sex-selective abortions by making the necessary procedures accessible
and affordable. So does the access to information about medical
procedures that literacy brings. Apart from this direct means of
enforcing the preference for sons, increased household wealth may
increase overall childhood survival rates, yet also increase the survival
gap if a disproportionate share of the increase goes to investments in
the health of boys.
The picture becomes more complicated if one disaggregates the
family, asking whether the preference for sons is common to all
members or enforced by husbands, and, if the latter, under what
conditions women might enforce contrary preferences. In addressing
the problem this way, it is helpful to adopt Amartya Sen’s description
173
of families as sites of “cooperative conflict.” In this model, the
various members of a family hold partly overlapping and partly
conflicting interests and values, which, taken together, produce a
single solution for the family’s use of resources.174 Any solution
includes both a set of priorities and an effective, usually informal set
175
of decision-making procedures for setting or balancing priorities. A
solution may be either relatively egalitarian or inegalitarian, either in
its weighing of the preferences of various family members or in the
role it gives each member in decision-making procedures.176 A family

Goods and People, in RESOURCES, VALUES AND DEVELOPMENT 509, 509–10 (1984) (“[T]he
process of economic development is best seen as an expansion of people’s ‘capabilities.’”);
AMARTYA SEN, Markets and Freedoms, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, 501, 506 (2003)
(“The opportunity aspect of freedom is, thus, concerned with our actual capability to achieve.”);
AMARTYA SEN, Opportunities and Freedoms, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra, at 583,
585 (“[M]ore freedom gives us more opportunity to achieve those things that we value, and have
reason to value. This aspect of freedom is concerned primarily with our ability to achieve.”);
AMARTYA SEN, Freedom and the Evaluation of Opportunity, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM,
supra, at 659 (analyzing formal features of the relationship between opportunity aspects of
freedom and individual preferences); and SEN, supra note 171, passim (describing the
connections between human development and increasing freedoms).
173. See SEN, supra note 171, at 192–93 (describing “decision making in the family” as a
“form of pursuing cooperation with some agreed solution . . . of the conflicting aspect”). For a
particularly helpful discussion and elaboration of Sen’s model, see BINA AGARWAL, A FIELD
OF ONE’S OWN: GENDER AND LAND RIGHTS IN SOUTH ASIA 53–81 (1994).
174. See SEN, supra note 171, at 192–93; AGARWAL, supra note 173, at 53–81.
175. See SEN, supra note 171, at 192–93; AGARWAL, supra note 173, at 53–81.
176. As Bina Agarwal points out, the variables that figure here are not just control of
resources, but also cultural ideas of which issues are at stake in negotiation and which are so
clearly settled as to be off-limits to bargaining. See AGARWAL, supra note 173, at 73–75.
Another important variable is which conditions women perceive as “problems” (whether or not
open to negotiation) bearing on their well-being or that of their children, and which are
accepted (preceding even the question of negotiability) as untroubling. Sen emphasizes the
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is thus, among other things, a site of negotiation over the terms of
cooperation, conducted among people who address a complex and
interwoven set of one another’s needs for survival, prosperity, and
177
flourishing. What happens when the balance of interdependence
changes in the negotiation of family decisions?
There is provocative evidence that when women’s bargaining
power increases, survival rates for girls rise relative to those for boys.
That is, the family’s decisions become more sex-egalitarian as women
increasingly enforce egalitarian or profemale preferences. More
precisely, two variables correspond to reduced sex inequality in
childhood survival rates: women’s literacy and women’s participation
178
in the workforce. These are, of course, indicators of development in
general; but they are also, specifically, indicators of how much women
have participated in the benefits of development.
These data suggest that something in these particular changes
enables women to enforce greater concern for daughters than maledominated households evince. That is, certain kinds of women’s
importance of an idea of false consciousness in this connection, suggesting that experience of
empowerment reveals interests previously obscure to the interest-holder. See Martha
Nussbaum, Charles Taylor: Explanation and Practical Reason, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 232,
232–41 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); SEN, The Possibility of Social Choice, in
RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 172, at 65, 90–92. Others argue that the poor are
always in some measure aware of their disadvantage, and simply require practical opportunities,
not enhanced insight, to challenge it. See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK:
EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1985) (explaining class relations using insights of
the peasants). Although I tend to follow Sen and Nussbaum in believing that exposure to new
experiences and ideas can revise one’s estimation of one’s interests—and that to believe the
contrary would be more condescending than even a crude false consciousness view—the present
argument does not require a judgment on this point. Increased capacity, or substantive freedom,
is open to interpretation as either a source of insight into one’s interests or an instrument for
pursuing and enforcing interests already recognized. On reasons to believe that selfunderstanding frames any negotiating process, see 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE
HUMAN SCIENCE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 34–37 (1985), arguing for the place of selfunderstanding in constituting activity such as politics or negotiation. Id.
177. Families, that is, pool resources for relative prosperity and provide forms of protection
that increase bodily security and integrity. Just as important, they provide intimacy and forms of
complex and ongoing interpersonal recognition—which may be on terms ranging from quite
reciprocal to highly nonreciprocal.
178. See ALAKA MALWADE BASU, CULTURE, THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AND
DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOUR: ILLUSTRATED WITH THE CASE OF INDIA 160–81 (1992)
(surveying and interpreting findings to this effect from India and elsewhere, including Latin
America and sub-Saharan Africa). Basu notes that, although sex ratios in childhood survival
improve with both variables, maternal employment is sometimes associated with reduced
overall rates of childhood survival, most likely because of the sacrifice of direct caregiving
implied by the decision to work outside the home, particularly for families on the edge of
survival. See id. at 170–73.
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development, although active mostly in the public setting of the
market, redound to the household by strengthening women’s
bargaining position. This change marks an increase in reciprocity
within the household, a reciprocity that enables women to enforce
their preferences in the negotiation that produces the family’s
solution in cooperative competition. It figures, in other words, in the
ongoing reworking of terms of recruitment, and thus of cooperation,
among profoundly interdependent people.
How might the enforcement of women’s preferences improve the
personhood status of females in household bargaining? One picture
would portray women as having a constantly sex-neutral or profemale
concern for their children, which increasing control of resources
enables them to enforce. In this model, control of material resources,
above all bringing wages into the household, would appear to be the
most significant change. Literacy would figure chiefly as instrumental
to employment. Women might spend their own wages to care for
their daughters, threaten to withhold money if a husband demands a
sex-selective abortion, or use the possibility of economic self-reliance
179
to threaten exit in a high-stakes dispute over a household decision.
These examples correspond to distinct and complementary aspects of
women’s bargaining power: respectively, personal control over
resources contributed to household expenditure; ability to withdraw
resources from the household pool; and the possibility of exit without
privation or material dependence on extended family, which of course
makes possible the credible threat of exit even for those who do not
really wish to exercise it.
One might also take a more dynamic view of the relationship
between women’s control over resources and their preferences.
Perhaps the economic status of women directly or indirectly
influences their self-regard and their estimation of their daughters’
prospective lives so that they do not simply enforce pre-existing
preference as their bargaining power grows, but develop increasingly

179. The reference is to ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). For his part, Sen notes
“considerable evidence that when women can and do earn income outside the household, this
tends to enhance the relative position of women even in the distributions within the household.”
SEN, supra note 171, at 194. He also suggests that literacy and education make women aware of
alternatives and give them some confidence in insisting on the legitimacy of their desires. Id. at
198–99. The phenomenology of these suggestions is of mixed voice and exit, which seems right.
TO
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egalitarian preferences as their experiences and capabilities change.
Where women work outside the home, the result may be a new set of
everyday interactions, experiences of competence and recognition,
and newly resulting expectations about the regard others should show
them, all redounding to the sense of agency in oneself and to one’s
idea of how other women’s lives might be lived.181 Literacy, too,
broadens awareness of possible lives that one might hope to lead.
The sex disparity I have described arises when female children
are regarded as less valuable as persons than males and family
decisions enforce that valuation. Increases in the family’s level of
resources and capabilities seem not to diminish the disparity. What
does make a difference is women’s power to assert value as resources,
measured in the labor market, in the negotiations that form the
family’s cooperative conflict. In a striking historical continuity, the
critical institution in this change, the labor market, is the same that
figured so centrally in the free labor account of how changes in the
rules of recruitment could make the resource and personhood
dimensions of human beings mutually reinforcing. At least in the
family’s internal negotiations, compared to negotiations over the
same decisions where women’s resource value counts only in the

180. This is a kind of moral-psychological corollary of the growing recognition that women’s
agency is a critical factor in economic and social development, not merely in the passive sense
that it makes women bearers of greater quanta of well-being, but in the active sense that
women’s empowerment contributes to development processes that affect both women and men.
This thesis is the thrust of the discussion in SEN, supra note 171, at 189–203. For a recent
summation of arguments and data supporting this view, see Isobel Coleman, The Payoff from
Women’s Rights, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2004, at 80, noting that “[e]ducated women have
fewer children; provide better nutrition, health, and education to their families; experience
significantly lower child mortality; and generate more income than women with little or no
schooling. Investing to educate them thus creates a virtuous cycle for their community.” Id. at
83.
181. See AGARWAL, supra note 173, at 421–66 (describing theoretically and in several casestudies how struggles over resources are also “struggles over meanings,” that is, over what
women’s and men’s interests are and how they should count). “Struggles” should be
underscored: women’s increasing control of resources has often resulted in both violence and a
recrudescence of male-supremacist politics. See id. at 271–76 (describing such reactions). The
view that changes in economic structure and opportunity and changes in individual values go
hand in hand appears to find confirmation also in the decline in native-born white American
fertility rates around the beginning of the nineteenth century, which prompted pronatalist
warnings of “race suicide.” See LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A
HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 100–01 (2002) (“The race-suicide alarm
was a response to the transformation of an entire society . . .”). Summarizing historians’ views of
that period, Linda Gordon concludes, “The economic reorganization that made smaller families
more economical also made upper- and middle-class women eager for broader horizons, which
in turn made them desire smaller families.” Id. at 100.
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domestic or other informal economy, the early-modern liberal vision
of free labor seems to come true in developing countries today.
Moreover, as I have argued, the change may be dynamic, reflecting a
change in which women in the workforce—particularly literate
women—come to value their own and other women’s personhood
more highly than before, so that the preferences they insist upon are
partly the fruits of the same changes that increase their bargaining
power within the family.
I do not mean to overlook the extent of suffering and injustice in
both the labor markets and households of developing countries, nor
would I want to portray participation in an often merciless private
economy as a simple experience of emancipation. That would
recapitulate the too-simple optimism of free labor ideologues, who
brought a once-emancipatory idea of formal equality and voluntarism
into the service of justifying harsh and effectively unequal economic
relationships. Nonetheless, the power of controlling a resource in
oneself is real and considerable, and to the extent that this power
creates reciprocity in other spheres of life, it can foster an increasingly
egalitarian idea of personhood, that is, of how and why people matter.
2. Appeals to Flourishing in the Production of Culture and
Knowledge. I now move to a very different setting. Yochai Benkler
argues that digital technology has changed the capital structure of the
production of culture and ideas in ways that create new opportunities
to organize some economic activity by appeals to flourishing rather
than prosperity.182 The backdrop to this thesis is the idea that because
industrial production requires concentrated capital, exemplified by
the factory, political decisionmakers have chosen to govern modern
economies by rules that promote maximum productivity under
conditions of capital concentration: allocation of resources by
markets and management of productive relations through

182. See generally Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy
of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2003) [hereinafter Benkler, Freedom in the Commons]
(discussing the social transformations resulting from the “networked information economy”);
Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a
Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004) [hereinafter Benkler, Sharing
Nicely] (discussing the emergence of social sharing in the technology industry and its capacity to
decrease transaction costs and increase efficiency). More specific citations to both articles
accompany the following discussion.
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183
hierarchically organized firms. Those rules have the incidental effect
of inhibiting individual initiative in production and creativity, both
because individuals often lack access to enough capital to produce
industrial-era goods and because they tend to find themselves in
hierarchically organized firms.184 The burden of Benkler’s argument is
that, even assuming the appropriateness of these industrial-era
arrangements, new technologies make maximum productivity
compatible with much greater individual initiative in production.
Benkler’s analysis concentrates on several technological
phenomena. One is the proliferation of productive capital on a scale
suited to individual ownership, in packages that routinely include
substantial capacity in excess of what the individual owner wishes to
185
use. The paradigm is the personal computer, which typically holds
much more computing capacity than its owner uses at any time.
(Other goods that have the excess-capacity feature, although they are
not “productive capital,” include automobiles and backyard
swimming pools.)186 The heart of Benkler’s argument is that, in many
circumstances, voluntary sharing of this excess capacity may be a
lower-cost way of deploying it than use of a pricing scheme.
Moreover, such sharing may result in uses that are just as socially
productive as the uses that market transfers would produce. Benkler
cites schemes in which computer users turn over their excess capacity
for large-scale computational, mapping, and other tasks which are
more cheaply performed by many networked units than by a single
mega-unit—particularly where the first alternative is given gratis.187
From the example of networked computers, Benkler moves by a
clever (but mostly implicit) analogy to suggest that people, like their

183. See Benkler, Freedom in the Commons, supra note 182, at 1247–48 (“An underlying
efficient limit on how we can pursue any mix of arrangements to implement our commitments
to democracy, autonomy, and equality . . . has been the pursuit of productivity and growth. . . .
[W]e have come to toil in the fields of political fulfillment under the limitation that we should
not give up too much productivity in pursuit of these values.”).
184. See id. at 1248 (“Efforts to advance workplace democracy have . . . often foundered on
the shoals—real or imagined—of these limits, as have many plans for redistribution in the name
of social justice. Market-based production has often seemed simply too productive to tinker
with.”).
185. See Benkler, Sharing Nicely, supra note 182, at 275–81 (designating as “lumpy” those
capital goods that typically come in packages that include excess capacity and as “mid-grained”
those whose scale encourages widespread personal ownership).
186. See id. at 281–89 (describing carpooling as a form of social sharing resulting from this
excess capacity of automobiles).
187. See id. at 289–96 (describing the efficiency advantages of distributed computing).

02__PURDY.DOC

2007]

3/9/2007 7:45 AM

PEOPLE AS RESOURCES

1109

laptops, frequently hold excess productive capacity relative to what
the market induces them to sell: people have free time and unused
talent. The same technology that makes possible the networking of
otherwise unused computing capacity to achieve more than a single
production unit could do permits voluntary combination of talents
and energy to productive ends.188 Dispersed knowledge and
decentralized effort are easily integrated through unifying programs
and databases, and participants not only provide their respective
ingredients to the stone soup, but also correct and improve one
another’s contributions. Benkler’s favorite examples are free, open
source software, which powers much of the world’s information
processing; the Wikipedia, a collaborative encyclopedia; and
Slashdot, a collaborative news-and-commentary compendium for
technophiles.189 These are significant technological and cultural
products, generated by the voluntary and decentralized coordination
of talents and energies. Although Benkler is deliberately agnostic as
to the motivation that leads people to this work, it is not much of a
stretch to suppose that some part of it falls along the axis of
flourishing: self-expression, the development of a sense of vocation,
and even play.190
Network technology makes these collaborative productions
possible, turning many who might have been solitary hobbyists into
participants in social production. Voluntary and decentralized
production gets a boost from another technological innovation, the
digital devices that have radically reduced the cost of the capital
necessary to produce and distribute cultural goods. Video, music, and
books (where electronically rendered) are now relatively inexpensive
to create and costless at the margin to reproduce—facts that threaten
191
the industrial-model gatekeepers of culture with obsolescence. In a

188. See Benkler, Freedom in the Commons, supra note 182, at 1256–60 (discussing
voluntary, loosely collaborative “peer production”).
189. See id.
190. Benkler goes so far as to say, “Capturing the potential for human action that could be
motivated by the exchange of love, status, and esteem, a personal sense of worth in relations
with others, is the strong suit of social production . . . . Social production rewards action either
solely in these forms or, if it adds money, organizes its flow in such a way that it at least does not
conflict with and undermine the quantum of self-confidence, love, esteem, or social networking
value obtained by the agent from acting.” Benkler, Sharing Nicely, supra note 182, at 328
(citations omitted).
191. See Benkler, Freedom in the Commons, supra note 182, at 1252–54 (discussing the
character of information as “nonrival,” a quality now attaching to cultural goods that can be
electronically reproduced and transmitted as mere information); Benkler, Sharing Nicely, supra
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sense, this situation promises to return cultural production to the
craftsman ideal that long attracted both left-wing and right-wing
critics of industrial market production: independent creation by
people who control their own productive capital and thus can operate
192
outside hierarchical firms (if not outside market imperatives).
Record companies, publishing houses, and the film industry have all
played roles analogous to that of factories in industrial production:
those who wanted to live by creating had to go through them. Now
that may cease to be true, at least for some creators.
B. The Analytics of Reciprocity: Reciprocity as a Vehicle of Freedom
In a previous article, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to
Property,193 I urged evaluating property regimes by the level of human
freedom they produce, where freedom is defined in the manner
Amartya Sen advocates, as the achievement of a suite of capabilities
that both secure the autonomy of choice and engage a meaningful set
of choices among courses of action and life that people value. I
proposed that priority be given to capabilities relating to the
satisfaction of basic needs and to meta-capabilities, those that enable
people to acquire still other capabilities or to revise their framing
circumstances, whether individually (through, say, skills acquisition or
therapeutic insight) or collectively (for instance, through political
participation).194 The first criterion amounts to a variant on classical
utilitarianism in that it supposes rough-and-ready interpersonal
comparability of levels of capabilities and diminishing marginal
returns from command of resources as one’s purposes move from the
195
essential to the elective. The second criterion runs in the direction

note 182, at 349–51 (“[I]n displacing industrial distribution, peer-to-peer distribution is thought
both by its critics and by some of its adherents to be likely to undermine the very possibility of
industrial production of music.”).
192. For a discussion of this idea, see Ian Shapiro, Resources, Capacities, and Ownership:
The Workmanship Ideal and Distributive Justice, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF
PROPERTY 21, 21–42 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995) (describing the workmanship
ideal of ownership as centering around “the conviction that so long as the resources with which
people mix their productive capacities are justly acquired they may legitimately own the product
of that conjunction”).
193. See Purdy, supra note 1, at 1292–94 (describing a capabilities theory of freedom and the
ranking hierarchy of different capabilities).
194. See id.
195. Abandoning this view was an important move in the change from utilitarian to formal
Paretian accounts of efficiency, as well as the move to a substantive wealth-maximization
criterion. Both moves surrender the assumption even of weak interpersonal comparability of
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of a liberal conception of positive freedom: it makes a priority of
those capabilities that enable one to determine one’s own activity and
character, but does not stipulate the forms that activity and character
should take.
This Article has developed two points with implications for
thinking about the relationship of property regimes to freedom. The
first is the importance of understanding freedom relationally, in a
double sense. People’s capabilities reflect not just resources they
control (from currency to charisma), but their power to recruit others,
without whom major aims along all dimensions—survival, prosperity,
flourishing—will go unrealized. There are therefore significant limits
on any capabilities-based understanding of freedom that does not
give attention to the rules and circumstances of recruitment. At the
same time, ideas essential to filling out any relational conception of
freedom depend on law, culture, politics, and technology to bring
them to life in social relations. What threats and inducements may
people direct at one another? Which purposes are so important that
people must be protected in them, either by prohibition (so that the
value of autonomy rules out the threat to survival as a recruitment
device) or by guarantee (so that all enjoy access to a public domain, a
cultural commons of words, images, and music from which to furnish
their own expressive activity)? The answers to these questions
implicate views of people as ends: how human beings matter, which
qualities make them important and entitled to respect. The vitality,
even the plausibility of these ideas, however, depends in part on
whether they are expressed and reinforced in the terms of
recruitment, that is, how people conceive of and approach one
another in concrete social relations.
The chief distinction I propose is between reciprocal and
nonreciprocal dependence. As an ideal type, the slave relationship is
founded on nonreciprocal dependence for survival: the master can kill
the slave, but the slave cannot (with any roughly even level of
confidence) threaten to kill the master; so the slave accedes to the
196
master’s recruiting offer. By contrast, the Hobbesian social contract,
forged to avert the war of all against all, rests on reciprocal

utility. For a discussion of the origins and stakes of this change, see Robert Cooter & Peter
Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LIT. 507, 520–24
(1984).
196. See PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 9 (characterizing the slave relationship as a form of
personal domination).
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dependence for survival: all are threats to each, unless and until
individuals enter a compact designating a single authority to govern
197
their relations. Although liberal market society (not alone, but
prominently) has eliminated this recruitment appeal, much of the
politics of that society concerns the balance between reciprocal and
nonreciprocal dependence for prosperity. The core of Hale’s critique
of free labor jurisprudence was his insistence on the importance of
this distinction: if another can withhold from me resources that I
badly need, such as access to industrial capital to make my labor
productive, then that person’s threat is much more significant to me
than is my threat to that person to withhold my labor.198 If, however, I
enjoy access to capital of my own (such as digital technology), have a
wide set of alternative ways to meet my needs and wants (because of
broad skills or some endowment in material resources), or can
withhold labor collectively to tilt the balance of bargaining power in
favor of myself and others in my position, then our interdependence
may be more nearly reciprocal. Along the axis of flourishing, too, the
arrangements people make may reflect either reciprocal or
nonreciprocal dependence. The identity of the slaveholder, the
meaning of his life—and not only his prosperity—depended on nearly
unqualified domination of other persons. Making this form of identity
and vocation impossible was a signal aim of early-modern promarket
reformers.199 The self-understanding of wealthy patrons in a service
economy may be a mitigated version of the same form of personality.
In intimate relations, both erotic satisfaction and the forms of identity
that interweave with it have long been deeply shaped by
nonreciprocal dependence, particularly the socially enforced
dependence of women on men. One aim of the continuing struggle
over gender relations is to make possible genuinely reciprocal
foundations for entreaties to love and recognition.

197. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 86–138 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991) (1651) (describing the natural laws that make man predisposed to competition and
necessitate a social contract to govern interactions).
198. See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (discussing Hale’s position). Of course, in a working
labor market, the relevant difference will be in the aggregate bargaining positions of capital and
labor in any particular sectors, not the difference between individual bargainers; but although
the former largely determines the prices of the latter, it also rests on their aggregation. On this
point, see supra note 10 (Barbara Fried making this point as to Hale).
199. See discussion supra Part II.A (describing slave and feudal relations as being
incompatible with the free labor theorists’ basic views of commercial economy).
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The historical trajectory of critique, reform, and renewed critique
toward further reform that this Article has sketched follows a single
arc: the incremental replacement of nonreciprocal forms of
dependence with reciprocal forms. In each episode, successful reform
requires three elements. One is material conditions that make a
change in relative dependence possible, for instance, by increasing the
overall social surplus that is up for contest (as the rise of industrial
production did) or changing the capital structure of production in
ways that affect bargaining positions (as digital technology has done
in the production of culture and knowledge). Another is ideological
or cultural recognition of the possibility of change: the insight that
some dimension of nonreciprocal dependence is now an artifact of
human arrangements, not natural necessity, and a proposal as to why
a different arrangement would be better. The free labor agenda in law
and political economy was one instance of that recognition, and the
proposal to take advantage of digital technology to facilitate
voluntary and distributed production is another. The third element
present in each episode is a program of institutional action that can
concretely change the circumstances of recruitment, the rules of
recruitment, or both. Such programs range from the Thirteenth
Amendment, to minimum-wage laws, to guarantees of access to
cultural material for purposes of low-capital creative activity. An
increase in reciprocity is likely to be neither a pure artifact of political
will nor a sheer bequest of changed material conditions, but rather
the product of moral and institutional imagination exercised at the
juncture of novel technological potential and deliberate social and
political choice.
Why should seizing opportunities for increased reciprocity in
recruitment be an appropriate goal for reform of property regimes—
and correlatively, why should reciprocity be an attractive metric for
evaluating property regimes? Ideas of personhood give substance to
such concepts as fairness, justice, and freedom. These ideas have
histories rather than essences, and correspond—if that is the word—
not to eternal facts but to social practices, institutional forms, and
legal rules. Therefore, it may be productive to conceive of a legal
regime’s relationship to fairness, justice, and freedom as a dynamic
one. This would mean asking not whether the law is approaching
more closely to these standards, understood in a fixed and absolute
sense, but rather by what process it contributes to the ongoing process
of interpreting them and enforcing those interpretations. Specifically,
in seeking to enlist others in their aims, can people bring to bear
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outright coercion, or must they rely on the often subtle coercion of
need and constraint, or the more difficult and multifarious appeal of
persuasion? So far as conditions of dependence and, consequently,
terms of recruitment, are reciprocal, persuasion will occupy a greater
place in interpersonal appeals. Each person must then pursue his or
her purposes partly through their power to win the energies, the
talents, even the devotion of others.
The point of reciprocity, then, is not simply that it is just or
makes people more free. It is just, as measured by important
expressions of that idea, and it does make people more free in many
relevant respects. Just as importantly, however, reciprocity makes
everyone free to engage with the meaning, burdens, and hazards of
freedom, to participate by experiment and persuasion in its
continuing definition. This alone goes a distance toward freeing some
from acceding to others’ ideas of human purpose just to get by
because they depend for survival, prosperity, or flourishing on those
others. It also helps in freeing all from the grip of inherited ideas
about human value and purpose that have persisted only because
those who bear their cost have lacked the chance to question or resist
them and shape alternatives.
C. Analytics II: Appeals to Flourishing under Relative Reciprocity
What is the best understanding of reciprocity in terms of the core
problem of this Article, people’s dual character as resources and as
ends? The most powerful and credible account involves an increase in
the significance of appeals to flourishing in organizing economic life.
This idea appears in fragments in scholarly discussions of
decentralized and voluntary production as a contributor to autonomy,
but no one has drawn together the strands or shown how ideals of
autonomy might require a specific mode of recruitment if they are
ever to be made good. Setting out this idea in the peer-production
setting offers an image of what it might mean generally.
There is a basic and probably willful confusion in Adam Smith’s
200
characterization of market relations as free and reciprocal. The
201
offer of a shilling is not an exercise in persuasion. It is of course an
appeal to interest, and the very fact of the appeal carries the

200. See supra text accompanying notes 93–102.
201. See SMITH, supra note 104 (stating feudalism in Europe is not an abolishment of
slavery, but a different form).
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concession that was so important to the early defenders of markets:
that people must be recruited by winning their assent, not by wresting
it bodily from them. As Hale recognized, however, in offering a
shilling one proposes to win the other’s assent by appealing to a wish
202
to avoid deprivation—at the limit, absolute deprivation. (Naturally,
once one has a sum of money, one may do all sorts of things with it
that go well beyond avoiding starvation. These will be in one’s mind
in accepting or rejecting a money offer.) Moreover the appeal to need
is not really an interpersonal one: with the prices of all resources set
by market aggregation, workers know what their labor is worth and
how much they must earn to satisfy basic needs and nonbasic wants;
all bargaining proceeds in the matrix of market pricing, so that a
recruitment appeal to one individual’s need is in a real sense just an
instance of a general calculus of need. The participants are from this
perspective fungible features of the system.
How might this change where an economy takes on some of the
qualities Benkler identifies: diffusion of productive capital; an
increase in the economic value of unique rather than fungible human
capital, such as creativity, aesthetic or ethical judgment, or broad and
synthetic knowledge; and increasing opportunities to participate in
nonmarket production motivated by desire for the esteem of peers,
consonance with one’s own values, or self-expression?203 The critical
difference will be in the type of recruitment appeal likely to be most
effective. Consider, for instance, how an entrepreneur in a peerproduction scheme will appeal to contributors whose music, essays,
videos, or other products she wishes to solicit. How will she
distinguish herself from any other would-be impresario of the peerproduction world? First, she cannot do it by simple capital
accumulation, because her mode of production is premised on widely
distributed productive capital; where a factory owner can distinguish
himself in recruitment by the fact of controlling a major piece of
capital whose concentration is necessary to industrial production, that
advantage is not available here.204 Second, whatever appeal she makes
will have to take account of competition from other entrepreneurs
202. See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (discussing Hale’s thought).
203. See supra note 182 (describing Benkler’s articles which identify social sharing and
increased efficiency as several of many qualities of the networked-information economy).
204. This point follows Hale’s observation that the market actor who succeeds in
accumulating a good deal of productive capital thus achieves a significant advantage in
bargaining position over one who does not have the same success in accumulation. See HALE
supra note 9, at 17–18 (discussing the bargaining advantage of the factory owner).
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with similarly low capital-based barriers to entry. Third and more
speculatively, in recruiting nonfungible, creative resources, she may
have to consider a dynamic relationship between the manner of the
recruitment and the quality of the product: more dramatically than in
the case of replicable physical tasks, the quality of creative products
reflects the state of mind of the creator. A grudgingly composed
sonnet, symphony, or screed, absent certain perverse forms of genius
(both O. Henry and Douglas Adams were reportedly locked in hotel
rooms to induce them to finish their best work), will likely reflect the
resentment of the creator more vividly than a grudgingly completed
oil-change or sheetrocking job.
A part of the recruitment appeal under such circumstances, then,
may be precisely to the self-understandings of the recruited
participants: their estimation of what in their activity and in the larger
world gives meaning to their lives. This type of appeal is familiar from
advertising and branding, that is, appeals to people as consumers
205
rather than producers. It is standard in those areas to appeal to
people’s ideas of who they are or would like to be: progressive and
environmentally conscious shoppers at Whole Foods supermarkets;
discriminating and upscale diners at Babbo, Chez Panisse, or Per Se;
sleek and athletic wearers of the Nike Swoosh; elevated and
intimidating drivers of Hummers; and so forth.206 In the recruitment of
people as producers it is a commonplace that the pleasantness of the
work, which may include short or flexible hours or some more basic
compatibility with the tastes of a prospective worker, is part of the
compensation. The effect of the shift I am imagining would be to
increase the importance of this aspect of recruitment, even making it
central to the recruitment appeal. This would mean tilting
recruitment away from the need-prosperity axis and in the direction
of the flourishing axis, whose chief appeals are those of vocation and
love: join me, and you will be more yourself than you would
otherwise be.

205. I discuss the significance of the creation, appropriation, and subversion of brand
identity in cultural politics and in the politics of global economic regulation in JEDEDIAH
PURDY, BEING AMERICA: LIBERTY, COMMERCE, AND VIOLENCE IN AN AMERICAN WORLD
221–40 (2003). In that discussion I draw attention both to the historical continuity between
Adam Smith’s idea of commerce as persuasion and the contemporary politics of branding, and
to the way the latter politics has shaped the fight over sweatshop regulation in poor countries.
Id. at 232–40.
206. See id. at 223–30 (discussing the self-conceptions that branding campaigns appeal to
and seek to shape).
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CONCLUSION
People need one another, and this makes us valuable to one
another. It also makes us dangerous to one another. To make good
our purposes, plans, and wishes we must recruit the time, effort, and
even the beliefs and sentiments of others. We are one another’s
hostages and one another’s completion.
This often painful paradox in human life produces one of the
essential tasks of law, and particularly the law of property: defining
the boundary between those respects in which people must approach
one another as persons, and those in which they may lay claim to one
another as resources. I have shown the interaction of these two
inextricable dimensions of human activity in legal doctrine, the
framing debates of political and economic thought, and a theoretical
account of interdependence and autonomy. I have also argued that
quite disparate aspects of contemporary life present opportunities to
seize a margin of reciprocity in relations of recruitment. This could
make people more free and appeals to flourishing more prominent.
At least a part of our personhood arises from our capacity to
pose the question, “What should I do?” and to understand the answer
as a matter of right and wrong, better and worse. Our nature as
resources has led us constantly to override this capacity in others, to
win them to us by open or subtle threat, not by free judgment and
assent. In ordering our relations to one another as resources—what I
have called our relations of recruitment—by principles of reciprocity,
we redress some of the mutilation that our nature as resources has
visited over and again on our nature as ends. By making persuasion
the means of winning over others, we partly redeem the universal
capacity of freedom, the power to ask the question whose answer lies
in conceptions of freedom, of human value and purpose: “What
should I do?” An economy may be called freedom-promoting in the
measure that it makes the answer to this question the touchstone of
the other question we are always addressing together: “What shall we
do today?”

